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UNITED STATES v. CALDWELL, No. 70-57
Preliminary Note:
This memo, dictated prior to the argument and before a complete
review of briefs, is intended merely to identify the issue. In due time,
I will have a bench memo which will present both sides more fully.
Caldwell, N.Y. Times reporter, specializing on Black Panthers,
refused to respond to grand jury subpoena and was held guilty of contempt
by district court. Contempt order reversed on appeal by 9th Circuit panel,
( Merrill, Ely and Jameson).

Actually, the opinion of C. A. 9 differed little

in substance from the opinion of district judge, although it reached a
different result on the critical point whether Caldwell had to respond
to the subpoena.

The district court issue a'protective order" which

required Caldwell to appear that specified that until the government
demonstrated'a compelling and overriding national interest in requiring
Caldwell's testimony which cannot be served by any alternative means, "
(i) he shall not be required to reveal confidential information or sources
about or from the Black Panther party unless the information was given
him for public disclosure; and (ii) that he should be permitted to consult
with counsel during the course of his appearance before the Grand Jury.

2.
The District Court found that the government had shown no compelling
or overriding national interest, but still required Caldwell to appear - subject
to the "protective order".
Caldwell's Position:
That the protective order was not sufficient; that the mere appearance
before the Grand Jury would impair his capacity to function with the Black
Panthers and provide news from them; and that, under the First Amendment,
there was no right to compel him to testify - regardless of protective
provisions - until the government shows the compelling need and that it
cannot be met by alternative means.
Holding of Court:
The Court's decision, characterized as a narrow and limited one,
as as follows:
"In light of these considerations we hold that where it has
been shown that the public's Flrst Amendment right to be
informed would be jeopardized by requiring a journalist
to submit to secret Grand Jury interrogation, the government must respond by demonstrating a compelling need
for the witnesses' presence before judicial process properly
can issue to require attendance. We go no further than to
announce this general rule. " Appendix 125

3.
Judge Jameson:
Concurred, but quoted at length from Garland v. Tory, 259 F. 2d 545,
548 (opinion by Mr. Justice stewart).
Judge Jameson concluded his concurring opinion in the following
helpful manner:
"Accordingly we are concerned with the narrow question
of whether the Government's showing of a 'compelling and
overriding national interest that cannot be served by any
alternative means' may be required in advance of the
issuance of a subpoena.
"Appellant did not have any express constitutional right
to decline to appear before the grand jury. This is a duty
required of all citizens. Nor has Congress enacted legislation to accord any type of privilege to a news reporter.
In my opinion the order of the district court could properly
be affirmed, and this would accord with the customary procedure of requiring a witness to seek a protective order
after appearing before the grand jury. I have concluded,
however, that Judge Merrill's opinion properly holds that
the same results may be achieved by requiring the Government to demonstrate the compelling need for the witness's
presence prior to the issuance of a subpoena and in this
manner avoid any unnecessary impingement of First
Amendment rights.
"As Judge Merrill has suggested, this is a case of first
impression. It would seem that the district court could
develop procedures which would not unduly hamper or
interfere with the investigatory powers of the grand jury.
The Government would have the same burden, except that
it would make its showing at a hearing in advance of the
issuance of subpoenas rather than after the witness appears
and seeks a protective order." Appendix 129-30.

4.
Position of Caldwell, the New York Times and the other broadcast media:
Prof. Bickel's brief amicus, deals with all three cases, but is
primarily concerned with Caldwell. His "statement" (p. 5) and "summary
of argument" (p. 7) are helpful.
Bickel's basic position is that a reporter cannot be made to testify
until "three minimal tests" are met, namely:
"A reporter cannot, consistently with the Constitution,
be made to divulge confidences to a government investigative
body unless three minimal tests have all been met: A. The
government must clearly show that there is probable cause
to believe that the reporter possesses information which is
specifically relevant to a specific probable violation of law.
B. The government must clearly show that the information
it seekJ.s cannot be obtained by alternative means, which
is to say, from sources other than the reporter. C. The
government must clearly demonstrate a compelling and
overriding interest in the information."
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BENCH MEMO

(S.C..C..~Ifw'.._,~~'"·'"1"f'~

No. 70-57 OT1971
United States v. Caldwell
Cert to CA 9 (Merrill 9 Ely1 Jameson"-concurring)
In re Paul Pappas
No. 70-94 OT 1971
Cert to Mass. Supreme Jud Ct
No. 70-85 OT 1971
Brarrzburg v. Hayes & Meigs
Cert to Ky Ct App

PREFACE
Because of the close similarity in these three cases, and
because they each share a common core Constitutional question,
I have decided to treat them all in a single memo.

My review

of the briefs and of the basic precedents they rely upon
convinces me that there is no case heretofore decided by
this Court which might be viewed as "controlling."

There is

a long string of First Amendment precedents which shed
light on the First Amendment interests involved and on the
conventional mode of analysisp and I will cite those cases
where pertinent in the course of my discussion .

..

QUESTIONS PRESENTED
(1)

Do the First Amendment fre.edems of speech and press

contemplate a qualified right for newsmen to maintain the
confidentiality of their sources and of information received
from those sources?
(2)

If such a right exists, under what circumstances

must it bend to accommodate the public interest in grand jury
investigations of criminal activity?

FACTS
(1)

United States v. Caldwell

Caldwell is a Black reporter for the New York Times. He
was assigned to cover the activities of the Black Panther
Party in the San Francisco area.

Over a considerable span

of time he developed a relation of confidence with the Panther
leaders and rank-and-file.

Because of that relationship he

was able to write some 16 articles about the Panthers which
appeared initially in the Times and were reprinted in many
other newspapers.

Two of Caldwell's stories are reprinted

in the Appendix (Pp. 83-89).

The first tells the story of

the Panthers' Food-for-children Project which feeds several
thousand Black children breakfast every day in 6 major metropolitan areas in California.

The story is a balanced pre-

sentation, pointing out both the physical benefits to the
young and the consistent effort to propagandize these kids.
The second story tells of a change in to~e within the party.
It notes that the leaders have lost some of their former
militancy, that they speak of the unacceptability of Black
racism and of the need for unity of radical

~uses .

It is

--3-unchallenged that these articles have made a unique and sub"
stantial contribution to the public understanding of this
particular militant group.
In February and March, 1970, Caldwell received two subpoenas to appear and testify before a federal grand jury sitting
in California.

The first contained a subpoena duces tecum clause

but the second was only a subpoena ad testificandum.

Caldwell

filed a motion to quash the subpoenas in the USDC ND Calif on
grounds that the appearance required would interfere with
First Amendment rights.

The Go~ withdrew the duces tecum

subpoena, leaving only the latter subpoena.

-

The DC denied

the motion but helti that Caldwell was entitled to a delimiting
protective order.

-

That order, recognizing a First Amendment

interest, required that the Govt's attoneys show a "compelling
and overriding national interest" in any information requested before requiring Caldwell to answer, insofar as the
questions called for the disclosure of sources or information
obtained in confidence.

Caldwell appealed to the CA9s the

Govvt ppposed on the ground that the DC order was not final
and appealable.

The CA dismissed the appeal, apparently on

the ground proffered by the Gov't.
Subsequently, the term of the grand jury ended, another
grand jury was selected, and another subpoena ad testificandum
was served on Caldwell.

Again, Caldwell sought to have the

subpoena quashed in the USDC ND Calif.

The motion was heard

by the same DC Judge (Zirpoli) and the motion was denied subject to an almost identical protective order.

Caldwell re-

fused to appear and the DC ordered him to show cause why he

- -

should not be held in contempt.

,.

On June 5, he was held in

.. -4-contempt.

At the contempt hearing Caldwell submitted a sworn

affidavit stating that there was nothing he could testify to
which was not protected by the protective order and that,
therefore, his attendance was unnecessary.
controvert the affidavit.
/

The Gov't did not

\

On appeal to the CA9 it was Clad-

well's contention that he should not be required to appear.
The Gov 9 t chose not to challenge the propriety of the pro-

-

tectiv~o;:der

-

but did contest the alleged right not to

appear.
TheCA held in Caldwell's favor and reversed the DC.

That

ct found a First Amendment right to confidentiality; found it
i

necessary to balance the competiYhg First Amendment and
grand-jury-criminal-investigation issues; and held that the
Govt must show some compelling need before it could require
a reporter to appear.

(2)

The Gov't sought cert to this Court.

In re Pappas

Paul Pappas is a

newsman~photographer

New Bedford, Massachusetts.

for a TV station in

During the course of reporting on

civil disorders in New Bedford, the local Black Panther leader,
Bob Heard, agreed to allow Pappas to enter Panther headquarters to spend the night.

The Pantheres anticipated a

police raid that night and reached an agreement with Pappas
that he could report the anticipated raid but that, if no
raid materialized, he was not to report anything that he
saw or heard.

Pappas did spend the night there, no raid

occurred, and Pappas reported no story.

Two months later

Pappas was summoned to appear before a state (Bristol County)
grand jury.

He appeared and testified as to events occurring

--5--

outside the headquarters on the date in question but refused
to speak about events which transpired inside.
later he was summoned to appear again.

Several days

This time, however, he

--

filed in state ct a motion to quash the summons, stating as
,.,
one of grounds that compelled disclosure would violate his

-

First Amendment right to confidentiality.

The TC held that

Pappas had no Constitutional or other basis on which to refuse
to answer questions before the grand jury and ordered him to
appear.

Because of the novelty of the question, however, the

TC "reported the case" to the Mass. Supreme Judicial Ct.

-

That ct aff•d the TC and specifically rejected the holding
in Caldwell that the Constitution contemplates a newsman's
-.-.._._

privilege
...,.. •

l

Pappas was again ordered to appear before the grand jury.
He applied for cert to this Court and Justice Brannan stayed
the order pending resolution here.

(3)

Branzburg v. Haves & Meigs

Paul Branzburg is a reporter for the Louisville Courier-,
Journal.

He specialized in reporting on the drug problems

-

associated with the "hippie
..,__ community" in the Louisville
area.

Two of his articles are the source of the controversy

in this case.

In November, 1969, an article appeared describ-

ing the production of hashish from Marijuana by two Louisville
0

ypuths.

Before doing the article, Branzburg promised the

youths that he would not divu~ their identities,

Branzbur~

was subpoenaed to appear before the Jefferson County grand
jury.

He appeared but refused to tell the grand jury who

the~shish-makers

1

'

;ere.

The foreman

of~he

gran4fury

~~

~~

~

--6-then brought Branzburg before the local TC where he was
ordered to answer the questions despite Branzburg's contenions that to answer would violate his First Amendment
and statutory rights.

He appealed to the Kentucky Ct App

claiming that he should be immune from the requirement to
divulge the name of his sources.

That ct focused primarily

on Branzburg's statutory claim under a Kentucky law and
found that it did not cover Branzburg's case.

..

That ct also

-

~

---'-"

_

rejected his First Amendment claim on the ground that the
reporter had abandoned his claim in favor of the statutory

-

claim.

Branz burg filed a motion to reconsider, bringing to

t he Ct's attention the Ninth Circuit opinion in Caldwell.

The

Ct modified its opinion to state that Branzburg had not
pursued his federal constitutional claim.

Therefore, the

first opinion--with respect to the hashish-making story-does not turn on the First Amendment but on

!.t-t~- ~

the~statute.

A second proceeding is also involved in this case.

In

January, 1971, Branzburg had another article published in the
newspaper, this one dealing with the response of local
high school and college youths to laws against marijuana use.
Eight days after the article appeared, Branzburg was subpoenaed
to appear before the Franklin Cty grand jury.

Instead of

attending, Branzburg moved that the subpoena be quashed.

~~

~ ·

This motion was premised primarily on the First Amendment

~

and relied extensively on the Caldwell opinion.

~

The TC

Judge denied the motion but did enter a protective order

~

much like that issued by the DC in Caldwell.

h~ ~

It ordered

to appear; stated that he need not reveal confidential sources,
or information given in confidence; and that he could have an

--7-attorney present to advise him.

However, the order differed

from the DC order in Caldwell in that it included the following limiting caveat:

-

Branzburg

may not "refuse to answer

-

any questions which concern or pertain to any criminal act,
the commission of which was actually observed."
Branzburg immediately appealed to the Ct App.

On the same

day that it modified the opinion in the hashish case, the Ct
J-(!. fv.r<!.j}
App d
·~ to interfere with the TC order to appear in this
latter case.

The Ct App opinion deals at length with Branz-

burg's reliance on Caldwell.

Two grounds were found on

which to distinguish that cases (1) there was no proof in
this case that Branzburg 0 s sources would cease speaking freely
to him; and (2) Branzburg had not shown or alleged that any
evidence he might have was protected by the revs protective
order.

The Ct App goes on to indicate that it has "misgivings"

about the Caldwell holding.

The Ct does not appear to hold

that no newsman privilege may be found in the First Amendment.
Rather it holds that, in view of the importance of the grand

l

jury function, no serious threat to First Amendment rights

had been shown "by the facts of this case."

It labels Branz-

burg's speculation that appearance would cause the drying up
of sources as so "tenuous" as not to constitute an"abridgement
of the freedom of the press."

Pending cert, Justice Stewart

stayed both of the orders to appear involved in this case.

DISCUSSION
Taken together, these three cases represent a rather
broad spectrum of judicial opinion on the question whether
the First Amendment comprehends a privilege for newsgatherers

..

--8- ..

to protect the confidentiality of their

sources ~ne

court

(the Massachusetts ct in Pappas) rejects altogether the
contention that First Amendment values are at stake in a
newsman's objection to a summons to

a~ar

and testify about

confidentially a~quired
information; ~second court (the
.__.
Kentucky ct in Branzburg) has "misgivings" about the existence
of such a Constitutional right but finds that, at least where
no evidemce of ruptured relationships is shown, a newsman
~~be

required to tell a grand jury about criminal activity;

~ird court (the Ninth Circuit in Caldwell) clearly sees
the privilege, recognizes that it is not absolute and must
be balanced against other interests in criminal administration,
and proceeds to lay down a formula for arriving at the necessary
balance.

Obviously, then, if the Pappas view prevails all

other questions are foreclosed.

Only if the Court finds a

Constitutional basis for the privilege do the problems of
Branzburg and Caldwell come into the scene.

Therefore, your

attention should focus first on the bedrock Constitutional
inquiry.

(1) Is there a First Amendment foundation for the newsman's
privilege?
Resolution of this question depends on the acceptance of
one Constitutional principle and onep or at most two, factual
principles.
(a)

Constitutional principle
The First Amendment is written in absolute termsa

"Con-

gress shall make no law • . . abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press • •

..

II

The Court has never accepted the

--9--

view espoused by Justices Black and Douglas that the First
Amendment means what it says.

Rathe~

the Court has con-

sistently followed a course suggested by the Solicitor
General last Term in New York Times Co. v. United Statesp
403

u.s.

(1971):

"Now, Mr. Justice Black • • • you say that no law means
no law, and that should be obvious. I can only say, Mr.
Justice that to me it is equally obvious that 'no law'
does not mean 'no law 0 • • • the First Amendment was
not intended to make it impossible for the executive to
function or protect the security of the United States."
Since the Court has never adopted the absolutist view of the
First Amendment, it has always been necessary for the Court
to approach questions under this Amendment with an eye to
the purposes served by the freedoms of speech and press.

The

function of those freedoms relied on by the newsmen in these
cases-~and

by all the news people in the amicus

the notion that a

self~governing

access to information.

briefs~~is

people must have an open

The "access" theme is one that runs

throughout the First Amendment history.
pressed by Madison in these terms:

The theme was ex-

"A popular government

without popular information or the means of acquiring it, is but
a farce or a tragedy, or perhaps both." The Complete Madison,
at 337.
opinions.

It has been expressed in innumerable Supreme Court
New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270-71 is

often cited: "(The First Amendment stands for a) profound
national commitment to the principle that debate on public
issues should

4e

uninhibited, robust, and wide-open."

This

commitment was reaffirmed last Term in Rosenbloom v.Metromedia, 403 U.S.

(1971): it is the "Amendment 0 s function

to encourage ventilation of public issues."

•'t>.

Sl. op. at 16 .

.. -10-Probably the clearest statement of the public's interest is
to be found in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395

U.S.

367, 390 (1969)• "It is the right of the viewers and listeners,
not the broadcasters, which is paramount."

. . . "It is

the

purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited
marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail
• • • • " "It is the right of the people to receive suitable
access to social, political, estheticp moral, and other ideas
and experiences which is crucial."
The public's access right is all that the First Amendment can be fairly read to protect in this case.

At several

points it appears that newsmen would argue for a privilege
running directly to themselves.

The only consideration

which gives legitimacy to that privilege is a derivative
right for newsmen because confidentiality may increase the
pool of accessible

knowl~dge.

Newsmen are nothing more than

the conduits--the gatherers--who take the news from its
sources and pass it on to the people.

Their rights are

no greater than the right of the people to receive news.
When the courts allow a newsman to raise the First Amendment
as a bar to some form of governmental

inter~ference,

..,..j,<:.y

_.,are

allowing him to raise a right that belongs to the recipients of
news.
The Constitutional principle, then, is simply that the
•
t.-oJpeople's right to receive news/protected by the First Amend-

-

---------------------~
ment.
I do not think that any Justice on the Court will take
..........

issue with that principle.

--11--

(b)

F~tual

principles

The hard question is whether--as a matter of "Constitutional factU-requiring newsmen to appear before grand juries
to testify about the sources of news or the information obtained from those sources (or in some cases appearing at all)
infringes upon the First Amendment interest in public knowledge.

It may be helpful to stack up the evidence on both

sides as it may be gleaned from the cases now before the
Court.
First, on the side of recognizing that compulsory process
may interfere with the exercise of First Amendment rights, the
Court has the record painstakingly developed by the Respondents
in United States v. Caldwell. Some 25 affidavits are reprinted
in the appendix to Resp's brief.

These affidavits represent

the views of well known newspaper reporters as well as TV and
radio announcers and reporters.

The uncontroverted conclusion

to be derived from this collection of statements and annecdotes
is that a newsman must have the confidence of his sources and
it is often impossible to

s~stain

the confidential relation-

ship when the subject of the information fears that he cannot
be certain that the newsman will not be required to lay out
all his information to an investigating grand jury.

Both

the DC and CA found that these affidavits sustained a strong
~

showing

that 1~onfidentiality

is important to access.

Second, the factual assertions are reiterated and expanded in the numerous amicus briefs filed in this case. These
briefsp similarly to the affidavits in Caldwell, are more than
the self-serving declarations of the media.

It is impossible

to ignore the actual experiences recounted in which one or

--12-another reporter lost a valuable contact with an individual
or group

bec~e

a grand jury.

of his appearance and/or testimony before

Further buttressing the factual assertion

is the bulk of commentary--most of it in the last few years-indicating that the privilege has a factual basis in the
public's need for information.

While most of what has been

written is not empirical, two sources have been cited in the
briefs which do have an empirical basis.

11~ ~

The first is

Guest and Stanzler, The Constitutional Argument for Newsmen ~-~.,

~~

Concealing Their Sources, 64 N.W.U.L. Rev. 18 (1969) in

which the authors interviewed the editors of some 37 newspapers and concluded that huge percentages of news is ob-

tained from

informants who wish to remain confidential

~
~. ~

Pi~

(15 % of Wall Street Journal stories confidentially based;

-~
~

~

1/3 to 1/2 of Christian Science Monitor stories confidential).

The second is an empirical project conducted by Professor
Blasi at the University of Michigan.

~
~

He sent questionnaires

to over 900 newsmen; sent detailed inquiries to 67 of those;
and conducted in depth

inter~views

with 47 others.

The con-

clusions of that study are summarized in the reply brief
of Petr in Pappas, pp. 11-13. In essence, those conclusions
indicate the use of confidential relationships to improve the
quality of reporting is on the upswing; at least 10 % of
reporters use confidential sources for over 1/2 of their
stories; the guarantee of limited interference with ananimity
is most important when covlering dissident groups.
Some

~~ght,

thirdly, should be accorded the Attorney

General's opening statement in his recently promulgated
Guidelines for Subpoenas to the News Media (Appendix to

<

•

--13--

Resp's b~f in Caldwell) in which he states that "The Dept
of Justice recognizes that compulsory process in some circumstances may have a limiting effect on the exercise of
First Amendment rights."

The Government's view is augmented

by the statements of President Nixon at a Press Conference
in May of last year in which he said that he took

a "jaun-

diced view" of "Government action which requires the revealing
of sources."

The President stated that he would permit

Government incursion into the area of reporters' confidences
vJ

only when a "major crime" has been committed and the nesman°s
Jl

information will be "directly" helpful.

(See amicus brief

of New York Times (Bickel) at 11).
A review of all the sourses indicates that the public's

-

ri&ht to access to news is interferred with in two ways by
rupt£Fing--or the threat of rupturing--confidential presssource relationships.

-

First, the source will be more reluctant

to confide in a newsman if he is not relatively certain that
those items which he seeks to keep out of the public domain
will be honored.

Secondly, the newsman himself will be unwilling
p v hl~i h
in some cases to ~z&t§ c8@e the publishable material gained from

a confidant because of the fear that it will lead to grand
jury investigation--this is the self-censorship aspect of
the privilege.

The best example of that principle at work

is the Branzburg case.

If that reporter had known that his

information about the identity of marijuana smokers could
be required by a grand jury, his promise to retain the confidentiality of his source would have--or so he asserts-compelled him not to publish the stories in the first instance.
The valuable information contained in his accounts of the

,.

--14- ..

youthful appraisal of marijuana laws would not have become
known to the citizens in the Louisville area--at least not
from that reporter.
On the other side of the scales--controverting the
factual conclusions that the source will lose confidence in
his newsman, and that the newsman will censor himself-two primary considerations may ee considered.

p:l

First, the
!1

SG states in his amicus brief in Branzburg & Pappas, the
news media has flourished for over 180 years without a

-·

privileg_e.for newsmen.

.,..

_,...

He states (p. 5) that "such a

privilege is not essential to a meaningful exercise of the
protected freedoms of the press to write, to publish, and to
circulate the news."

This conclusion is said to derive from

the history of freedom of the press in this country.

Second,

a similar view is expressed by the Massachusetts court
when it stated that "Any effect on the free dissemination
of news is indirect, theoretical, and uncertain, and relates
at most to the future gathering of news."

The Kentucky

court, while not so certain that the First Amendment may not
play a significant role, similarly referred to the assertions
of interference with newsgathering as "speculation" which
found no support on the record in that case.

(c)

Conclusion on Question 1
I am in accord with the Caldwell Court that a factual

basis exists for concluding that the power of compulsory
process has an impact on the First Amendment.

The Consti ..

tutional principle that the freedom of press contemplates
the availability to the public of information, is virtually

--15--

unassailable.

Equally certain is the assertion that the

right to receive is no more valuable than the right of the
news media to gather the news.

--

The only serious question,

for me, is whether grand jury subpoenas ancisummons in any
s~stantial

way impinge on the gathering of news.

\

If I

could conclude that the grand jury power affects this gathering
process in only a de minimus fashion, I would be prepared
to ignore it as a serious consideration.

After all, almost

any type of governmental interference with the news gatherers
has an impact on the total pool of public information.
a mere showing of some impact,

If
~....,

however~insubstantial,

wewe

sufficient t o call into play the delicate balancing functions
of the Supreme Courtp the Court would be innundated with
cases running a spectrum from challenges to the requirement of
press passes to get into "background' briefings to the
maintenance of files marked "top secret."
The newsman's privilege does not fall into that category.
tv<Jl..;

The affidavits on file in these cases

sa esspecially crucial in
ignore.

they are by the secondary empirical and literary
and corroborated by the AG's Guidelines, I
Amendment must
comprehend some accommodation between the news gatherer and the
grand jury.

The SG 0 s response--they got along without it

before they had it--is off the point.

Certainly, none of

the reputtable affiants in Caldwell would assert that the
privilege is the central premise from which "meaningful"
exercise of First Amendment rights derives.
the privilege is not essential cannot be

,;

.

~

The fact that

~
take~mean

that it

--16- ...
has no place in the First Amendment.

Indeed, I am confident

that were the SG pushed, he would agree that the grand jury
does not possess an unlimited power to peer into the newsman's
confidential files.

The abused use of grand jury

subpoenas-~

just as the abused use of legislative investigations--may have
dramatic impact on the exercise of the First Amendment right
t9 gather and disseminate news.

(2)

Under what circumstances must the First Amendment

right to gather news and retain confidentiality of sources
bend to the public interest in grand jury investigation of
criminal activity?
What I have concluded so far requires reversal of the
Massachusetts Court in Pappas since that court found no
First Amendment interest at stake when a grand jury subpoenas
a newsman to divulge information gained under a promise of
secrecy.

In reversing that case, and in addressing itself

to the question of balancing or accommodating, the Court
will be required to respond to the Mass. Ct's charge that to
recognize a newsmanus privilege would be "judicial legislation."

This charge--unlike the same charge made in the

----

Death cases--is rather easily answered.

The entire history

of this Court's jurisprudence relating to the freedoms of

-

.

·;;;;:,.

speech and press is a demonstration that the analytical
_.,-

.........

-~

process required in this case is mandated by the

-

tution.

--

COQ§ti~

The Court's duty springs from the acklowledgement

that First Amendment rights are not absolute as the terms of
the Amendment might indicate.

Since there is no absolute, the

Court must always weigh ' the interests to be protected by the

--17 ....
Amendment against the interests of the State or Federal
Government alleged to require a constriction of those
interests.

If the First Amendment's history of balance and

accommodation is "judicial legislation," then it is legis ..
lation compelled by the Constitution.

New York Times v.

Sullivan, Hill v. Time, Inc., and Rosenbloom v. Metromedia,
struck the balance between the law of libel and the freedom
and
of the press. Near v. Minnesota,/New York Times v. United States,
struck a similar balance between the freedom of press and the
preservation of the national security.

Other examples

abounds Talley v. California• handbills may be distributed
anonymously despite the State's interests in knowing the
sources of such literature; Lamont v. Postmasters persons
may acquire communist political propaganda without disclosing
their identity in abvance to the Post Office; Gibson v. Florida
Legislative Investigating Committee; right to maintain confiA
dentiality of membership lists from investigative scrutiny:
Grosjean v. American Press Co., preservation of an "untrammelled
press" in the face of a tax on newspapers.

None of the

specific interests in First Amendment protections is
mentioned in the Amendment.

To that extent, every major

First Amendment precedent is judicial legislation.

It was

precisely because Justice Black feared the power in the hands
of lifetime Judges to make such ad hoc decisions that he
concluded that the Amendment must be treated as an absolute.
Short of adopting his view, the majority of this Court has
r,v

always eng;ged in the delicate balancing required in this case.
Prior to Caldwell, the only federal court that had passed
on the question of the relationship between the freedom of press

--18-and the "newsman's privilege" was the Second Circuit (per

I

Justice, then Judge, Stewart, sitting by designation) in
Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1958).

In that

case, the actress Judy Garland filed a defamation suit against
CBS for libelous statements allegedly made by one or more of
its executives.

Her suit was based on a newspaper column

in which a columnist, Marie Torre, attributed certain state"
ments to a CBS executive.

her

Torre was held in contempt for

refusal to divulge the source of her statement in a pretrial
deposition.

On appeal, the Second Circuit aff'd.

The

2d Circuitvs analysis is prototypical of what Caldwell and
the Petrs in the other cases request in this case.

That ct

recognized that "compulsory disclosure of a journalist's
confidential sources of information may entail an abridgment
of press freedom by imposing some limitation upon the availability of news."

The question for the ct was, therefore,

whether the interest served by compelling the testimony
justified the impairment of those First Amendment interests.
In this case, Torre's testimony was critical to the case; it

\t

was clear that she was the only one who knew the answer to
the question~ source; the incursion into the confidentiality
of the newsgatherer was slight.
Garland, as I read itg points in the proper direction
~

analytically.

........

,_.-a~

~

,....

Having found (or presumed) a First Amendment

interest, the task for the court was to strike an appropriate
balance which would permit the minimal interference with
tected rights while serving other valid interests.

pro~

The grand

jury has a pronounced interest in gaining "everymanvs information."

The investigation of criminal activity is critical

,.,
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to the maintenance of order.

At this stage it would serve

little purpose to attempt to indicate where the balance ought
to come to rest.

It may be more helpful simply to list some

of the considerations which ought to go into determining
whether the newsman should be compelled to testify.
(1)

What is the likelihood that the newsman will

have information--not already in the public domain- .. which
would be relevant to the investigation of some matter within
the scope of the pending investigation?

The amicus brief

for the NY Times suggets that the gov't be compelled to show
that there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been
committed and that the newsman will have evidence relevant to
that crime.

Probable cause seems too high a standard since,

-

as the SG points out in his opening brief in Caldwell, the
function of the grand jury is to determine whether probable
cause elists.
_,..

Some standard short of probable cause .. -but

h~gh enough to assure against a grand jury "fishing expedition"--

must be required.

The nature of the grand jury investigatory

technique is such that any juror may ask a witness virtually
any question.

For that reason the newsman should be assured that

there is a specific crime or pattern of crime under consid ..
eration.
(2)

The amicus NY Times brief also states that the grand

jury should be

permitted~compel
A

testimony relevant to

serious crimes, such as crimes of violence.

A grand jury

then would not be permitted to interrogate a newsman about

l

victimless crimeso such as drug violations like that involved
in Branzburg.

This restriction, it seems, goes too far.

It is

the function of grand jur.i es to investigate crime--crimes of

--20-violence as well as victimless crimes.
(3)

Central to the balance should be some criteria that

the information sought not be readily available from some
non-newsman source.

This is one of the desiderata in the

AGvs Guideliness "all reasonable attempts should be made
to obtain information from non-press sources before there is
any consideration of subpoenaing the press."

This is an

important aspect because the temptation would be too great
otherwise to use the press as "an investigative arm of the
Government" (Guidelines, p. lb of Resp's appendix).

The

press may be the most readily visible source of information
but newsmen are far from the only tool available to the Government.
(4)

The CA 9 in Caldwell

seemingly recognized that

some attention should also be paid to the particular source
in question.

The Ct stated, "it is not every news source

that is as sensitive as the Black Panther Party has been shown
to be • • • • It

Some confidential sources will not be fore-

closed to a newsman after he testifies before a grand jury,
no matter what he divulges, because it is in the interest of
the sonrce to continue to "leak" information--this would
appear often to be the case where Government executives
are concerned.

Some sources use the press as a tool to

express their own views--these sorts of sources are not likely
to be paranoid about the prespects of the newsman's loss
of confidential cover.

With some it is simply a calculated

risk.
(5)

The burden of establishing the elements necessary

to justify impairment of the confidential relationship

7
•
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should be on the Governmental entity.

And, the

test~-what-

ever its parameters--should be couched in the language which

I

has become familiar in First Amendment cases , i.e., the grand
jury must have some compelling or overriding interest in

_______

securing the testimony of the newsman.

before a trial court judge.

The
...............forum in which

I note that the Petr in Branzburg

I

argues that the Government should be forced to lay out its
reasons for wanting the newsman's testimony in an open hearing.
This suggestion should be rejected by the Court.

One of the

necessary elements of grand jury investigation is secrecy.
There is not good reason why that secrecy should be eroded
in the name of an initial determination of whether the grand
jury can call a newsman to testifyp .
(6)

In some cases, the appropriate balance may be

struck by a protective order by the TC judge, limiting the
scope of permissible grand jury inquiry--more

precisel~

limiting the scope of inquiry to which the newsman must respond unless he be held in contempt.

In other cases, the

only fair balance will require that the newsman not be asked
to testify at all.

.1,\

As In Caldwell, the mere appearance be-

fore the grand jury may be shown to precipitate a disruption
of confidential relations.

(l)

It should be kept in mind that the Court only sets

out the minimal requirements to assure reasonable protection
for the precious First Amendment rights and that, where the
State statutes are more protective of the newsman, or where
the federal Guidelines go farther than the Court has gone,
those standards would apply and govern 9

.e.

--22-(8)

There is also a concern expressed

in the reply

brief of the State of Mass. in Pappas that the Court will be
unable to drawn a line between the newsman and any other person who desires to make public his views.

That problem

is not alive on any of these cases since all three are
cases involving bona fide newsmen by any legitimate standard.
An important distinction, however, must be recognized to
exist between the newsman who acts as a conduit for the
views of others, who avails himself of the First Amendment
in order that the citizenry may receive the broadest range
of views, and the private citizen who seeks merely to exercise
his personal right of freedom of speech.

The newsman's right

of freedom of press is, necessarilyv broader than any one
individual's right of freedom of speech.

CONCLUSION
Essentially my conclusions area (1) the freedom of press
contemplates an interest in the maintenance of the confidentiality
of sources belonging to newsmen; (2) that interest is not
absolute and must bend to the compelling interests of the
government in investigating crime; (3) where the government
can show a compelling need for the testimony of a newsman,
even though it requires the disruption of confidential
sources, the newsman must testify.

The task for the author

of the Court's opinion will be to set out the basic broad
structute for dealing with the qualified right.
the framework need be established in these cases.
must be left to other cases.

No more than
Refinements

--23-If the Court goes down the road I suggest, it is likely
that all three cases will need to be remanded for reconsideration in light of the Court's opinion.

Ultimately, however,

I would anticipate that the basic holding of the Branzburg

w-id

and Caldwell opinions ta be affirmed, and the holding of the
Pappas opinion

"'~
~ be

reversed.

Branzburg involved an

investigation aimed at uncovering information relevant to
a specific criminal violation, i.e., violation of the drug
laws by youths smoking marijuana.

It appears clear that

this newsman is the source of the grand jury's concern and

....

that he may be the onlly
available source of the needed
v
information.

In Caldwell the Gov't has failed to demonstrate

why it is that they wish to have Resp testify.

Having accepted

the propriety of the protective order--taereby indicating
that it did not wish to inquire directly into confidential
sources or information--it may have precluded consideration
of the only evidence which Caldwell could offer.

His uncon-

troverted assertion that he has nothing else to add to the
storlies he has published leaves the Govt' with no consideration to place in the grand jury's side of the balance.
This is the peculiar sort of case in which the newsman's
privilege may well extend to immunity from appearance al•
togehher.

The fragile nature of the relationship has been

persuasively established and the Govt has failed to demonstrate any need for his testimony.
Pappas will call for reversal under any holding which
recognizes a newsman's privilege since it seems to repudiate
that notion completely.

However, tested by new standards, it

might well prove to be the easier of the cases now before the

,,,<

......

'

"

.--24--

Court.

Pappas himself had no carefully nurtured relation-

ship with the Panthers.

Pappas may well prove to be the only

man who can assist the grand jury in determining who was inside
the headquarters (this assumes that the grand jury is investigating the same circumstances with which Pappas was familiar).

LAH
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Tentative Impressions*
Although the facts in these cases differ, counsel for the media in the principal briefs and in the briefs amicus - are asserting a First
Amendment right - a right of constitutional proportions - to a privilege
against disclosing - in judicial or other proceedings - sources of
information or confidential information.
Statements of this position vary.

That in the brief on behalf

of Branzburg (at p. 9) is typical:
"The First Amendment provides newsmen a privilege
against compulsory appearances in closed proceedings
and against compulsory disclosure of confidential
information. In order to overcome this privilege, the
state has the heavy burden of proving, by clear and
convincing evidence, that the testimony of the reporter
is absolutely necessary to prevent direct, immediate
andirreparable prospective damage to the national
security, human life or liberty. Any lesser burden
does not adequately protect the press from state
action which endangers the freedom of the press
guaranteed by the First Amendment. "
*These impressions are dictated on the afternoon following argument
to record my initial and tentative impressions. I will have read,
in preparation for the arguments, the principal briefs, some of the
cases and the bench memo. I hope to do further study before the
Conference. My views are subject to change and to the discussion
at the Conference.

2.
Prof. Bickel, representing the New York Times and various
other media, states their position as follows:
"The First Amendment demands . . . that the reporter
be protected. The standard of protection can be defined
by objective criteria, and made self limiting in practice.
"A reporter cannot, consistently with the Constitution, be made to divulge confidences to a governmental
investigative body unless three minimal tests have all
been met. 1. The government must clearly show that
there is probable cause to believe that the reporter
possesses information which is specifically relevant
to a specific probable violation of law. 2. The
government must clearly show that the information
it seeks cannot be obtained by alternative means, which
is to say, from sources other than the reporter. 3.
The government must clearly demonstrate a compelling
and overriding interest in the information."
The decisions of the three courts differed materially. In
Caldwell, the Ninth Circuit agreed substantially with the press although its decision was narrowly drawn in light of the specific facts
(the government had not introduced any evidence to show a need for
the testimony).
In Branzburg, the court reached a different result from

Caldwell. It decided that the reporter would have to testify before
the grand jury, and it

express~ave doubt as to whether there was

any constitutional privilege. The reporter had not shown, as was true
in Caldwell, that he had no information - other than stories already

published - to disclose.

3.
In Pappas, the Massachusetts court held flatly that there was
no First Amendment privilege, qualified or absolute, available to
newsmen.
My Tentative Views:

establishing a constitutional
Branzburg: I woul
acsept a JJ of ik8 1 drsomng of tlitrcourt.
Pappas: It seems to me that the Massachusetts court may have
been right in holding that there is nov privilege as a matter of constitutional right, either absolute or qualified. But the Court did not
give due weight to the importance of balancing First Amendment
interests against the other interests involved.

I would be inclined

to reverse Pappas for reconsideration in light of the principles and
guidelines established in this Court's opinion.

*****
As to the cortro lling principles, I am tentatively inclined to
share the view expressed by Justice Stewart in Garland v. Torre,
259 F. 2d 545, namely, that there is no constitutional privilege

4.
specifically available to newsmen. Mr. Justice stewart also declined
to recognize - as I read his opinion - even an "evidentiary privilege"
(such as that available to a lawyer). He did emphasize the important
First Amendment interest involved, and concluded that these needed to
be balanced against the interest being served by the administration of

justice (in the Garland case the need to have the testimony of a critical
witness).
I have been interested in the protective order entered by Judge

Meigs in the Branzburg case (Appendix 46) which purported to protect
confidential sources and information, but required the witnesses to
appear before the grand jury and to answer questions ''which concern
or pertain to any criminal act, the commission of which was actually
observed by Branzburg. "
Some elaboration and refinement of Judge Meigs approach
might make sense. His qualification, for example, with respect to
crimes "actually observed" is not broad enough. Crimes which might
be planned or discussed in his presence should not be privileged.

Some of the "safeguards" proposed by counsel for the media such as imposing a heavy burden on the state to show a "compelling
and overriding interest", and to guarantee a public hearing prior to
the newsman being required to answer any question, go much too far.
L. F. P., Jr.
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The writ of certiorari m No. 70-85, Branzburg v.
Hayes and Branzburg V. M eigs, brings before ustwo
judgments of the Kentucky Court of Appeals, both involving petitioner Branzburg, a staff reporter for the
Courier-Journal, a daily newspaper published in Louisville, Jefferson County, Kentucky .

..

Brennan
St ewart
Marshall
Blackmun
Powe ll
Rehnquist

70-85, 70-94, & 70-57-0PINION
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BRANZB URG v. HAYES

On November 15, 1969, the Courier-Journal carried
a story under petitioner's byline describing in detail
his observatio
of two youn residents of Jefferson
County ~thesizing has us from marihuana, an activity which, they assert.ecl, earned them about $5,000 in
three weeks. The article included a photograph of a
pair of hands working above a laboratory table on which
was a substance identified by the caption as hashish.
The article stated that petitioner had promised not to
reveal the identity of the two hashish makers. 1 Petitioner 'vas shortly subpoenaed by the Jefferson County
grand jury; he appeared, but refused to identify the
individuals he had seen possessing marihuana or ttie
pti·sons he had seen making hashish from marihuana.~
A state trial court judge 3 ordered petitioner to answer
these questions and rejected his contention that the
Kentuck r )Orters )fivile e statute, Ky. Rev. Stat.
) 421.100, 4 t e First Amem ment o t 1e United States Con1
The article contained the following paragraph: "·I don't know
why I'm lrtting you do thi ~ story ,' j'onr informant] said quietly .
'To make the narcs (narcotics detectives) mad , I guess. That's the
main rrnson.' Howe\·er , Larry and his pnrtnr r asked for and reeri,·rd a promise that their narneH would be chnngrd." R ., at 3-4.
~ The Foreman of thr grand jury reported th:l t. prt itioner Branzburg had refused to an:;wer the following two questions : " # 1. On
Nowmber 12, or 13, 1960, who W< l ~ thr prr~on or per:;onH you obsrrved in po8~e~~ion of Marijtwn:~ , :~bout whirh you wrot e an :1rticle
in the Courier . .Joumal on N'o,·ember 15, 1969? #2 . On No,·rmber 12, or 13, 1969, who was the per;:;on or per. ons you obset'\'ed
compounding Marijuana , 1'rodueing same to a compound known :~s
Hnshish ?" R., at 6.
3
Judge J. Miles Pound . The present rr~pondent in this ea~e, lion .
John P. Haye~ , i:; thr ~ u cce~so r of .Judge Pound .
4
Ky. Re\'. St:1t. 421.100 pro\'ides:

"No person shall be compellrd to diselo;;e in any legal proceeding
or trial before any romt, or before any grand or petit jury, or before
the presiding officer of nny tribun~d, or his :~gent or :~gents, or

70-85, 70-94, & 70-57-0PINION
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stitution, or §§ 1, 2, and 8 of the Kentucky Constitution authorized his refusal to answer. Petitioner then
sought prohibition and mandamus in the Kentucky
Court of Appeals on the same grounds, but the
Court of Appeals denied the petition. Branzburg v.
Pound, 461 S. W. 2d 345 (1970). It held that petitioner
had abandoned his First Amendment argument in a
supplemental memorandum he had filed and tacitly
rejected his argument based on the Kentucky Constitution. It also construed Ky. Rev. Stat. 421.100 as
affording a newsman the privilege of refusing to divulge
the identity of an informant who supplied him with
information but held that the statute did not permit
a re )Orter to refuse to testify about events he had ob-

'

The second case involving petitioner Branzburg arose
out of his later story published on January 10, 1971,
which described in detail the usc of drugs in Frankfort,
Franklin County, Kentucky. The artiCfe reported that
in order to provide a comprehensive survey of the "drug
scene" in Frankfort, petitioner "had spent two weeks
interviewing several dozen drug users in the capital
city" and had seen some of them smoking marihuana.
A number of reported conversations with and observations of several unnamed drug users were recounted.
Subpoenaed to appear before a Franklin County grand
jury "to testify in the matter of violation of statutes
concerning use and sale of drugs," petitioner Branzburg
before the General Assembly, or any committee thereof, or before
any city or county legislatiYe body, or any committee thereof, or
elsewhere, the source of any information procured or obtained by
him, and publi~hed in a newspaper or by a radio or television broadcasting station by which he is engaged or employed, or with which
he is connected."

..
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moYecl to quash the summons; " the motion was de11ied
although an order was issued protecting Branzburg from
revealing "confidential associations, sources or information" but requiring that he "answer any questions which
concern or pertain to any criminal act, the commission of
which was actually observed by [him 1." Prior to the
time he was slated to appear before the grand jury, petitioner sought mandamus and prohibition from the Kentucky Court of Appeals, arguing that if he were forced to
go before the grand jury or to answer questions regarding the identity of informants or disclose information given to him in confidence, his effectiveneRs as a
reporter would be greatly damaged. The Court of ApPetitioner's Motion to Qu:t~h argued:
"If Mr. Branz burg \\"ere required to di~rlo~e t he~e eonfidenres to
the Grnnd .Tnry, or nny othrr person, he would thereby destroy the
rrhtion~hip of tnt~! whic·h hr pre~ently enjo~·s with tho8e in thr
drng culture. The~· would refu~e to speak to him: thry would herome ewn more reluctant than they nre now to ~peak to any new~
mnn: and the news media would therrby he vitall~r hampered in
their ability to rover the views and artivitir~ of tho8e im·olvrd in
the drug culture. The inrvit:~ble effect of the ~ubporna i~~urd to
Mr. Branzburg, if it not be qua~hrd b~· this Comt, will br to suppre~s vital First AmrndmPnt frrrdom~ of 1\Ir. Branzburg, of the
Courier-Journal. of the 1wws meclin. nne! of tho~r im·oh-rd in th<'
drug culture b~· driving a wrdf!;r of di~tru~t :~nd Rilrnre bet wrrn the
nrwR media nnd the drug culture. Thi~ Court ~hould not s;mrtion
n usr of its prore~R rntailin~ so dmsl iran inrm~ion upon Fir~t Amendment freedoms in thr ah~rnrr of romprlling Commonwralth interest
in requirinf!; 1\'Tr. Brnnzburg's appenranre beforr the Grand Jury.
It is insufficient mrrely to protect 1\Tr. Brnnzbmg's right to silrnre
nftrr he appenr~ brforr tltc Gr:md .Jury. This Comt sho11ld totally
cxruse Mr. Brnnzburg from re~ponding to the subpornn nnd e1·en
entering the Grnnd .Jur~· room. Once Mr. Brnnzburg i~ rrquirccl
to go behind thr rlo~ecl door;; of the Grand Jur~· room, hi~ rffrrtiYenr~s as a reportrr in the~e arras is totnlly dr~troyrd. Thr srrrecy
that surround~ Gr:md .Jury trstimon~· neces~nril~· int roducr" uncertainties in the minds of tho~c who fenr a betrayal of thrir confidences."
n., at 43-44.
5
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peals OllCO again denied tho requested writs, reaffirming
its construction of Ky. Rev. Stat. 421.100, and rejecting petitioner's claim of a First Amendment privilege.
It distinguished Caldwell v. United States, 434 F. 2d
1081 (CAO 1971), and it also announced its "misgivings"
about that decision, asserting that it represented "a
drastic departure from the generally recognir.cd rule
that the sources of information of a newspaper reporter
are not privileged under the First Amendment." It
characterir.ed petitioner's fear that his ability to obtain
news ":ould be destroyed as "so tenuous that it docs
not, in the opinion of this court, present ;i; abridgement
of freedom of the press within the meaning of that
term as used in the Constitution of the United States."
Petitioner sought a writ of certiorari to review both
judgments of the Kentucky Court of Appeals, and \\'C
granted the writ.r. 402 U. S. 942 (1971).
Aftrr the Kenturky Cnurt of A11prals' drri~ion in Branzbura v.
11':1~ announced, petitionrr filed a rrhc:11·ing motion in Branzburg v. Pound ~uggrsting that the Court hnd not pa~scclupon his First
Amcndmrnt nrgnmrnt anrl railing to the Comt 's at tent ion thr rcrcnt
Ninth Cirruit drriRion in Caldwell v. United Statrs. On .Jan. 22, 1971,
the Court clenircl petitioner'~ motion :1nd filed an amrncled opinion in
the r:18e, adding a footnote, 461 S. W. 2d, nt 346 n. 1, to indir:1tc
that pet t ioner lwei nbandoned hi~ Fir~t Amendmrnt argument nnd
electrcl to rrly wholly on Ky. Rev. Stat. 421.100 when he filrcl a
Snpplrmrntnl 1\'Temor::mclmn brfore oral argument. In his petit ion for prohibt it ion and mandamus, pctitionrr hnd rica rly rclird:
on thr Fir~t Amendment, and he hnd filrd his Supplemental Memorandum in rr~polh'r to thr Stntr~ memorandum in oppo~ition to
the granting of the writ~. AH its title indicates, this Mrmomndum
1ra~ com plrment ary to petitioner~ em·licr petition, and it dealt
primarily with thr State's ron~truetion of the phrase ">'ource of
information" in Ky. Rev. Stat. 421.100. The pa~::;age which thcKrntucky Court of A ppm!~ cited to indicate abandonmrnt of prtitionrr's First Amrnclmrnt claim is a~ follows:
6

Meigs

"Thus, the controversy continues as to whether a newsmnn's source
of information should be priYilrged. However, that question is not
before the Court in this case. The Legislature of Kentucky has

..
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In the Matter of Paul Pappa.s, No. 70-94, originated
"·hen petitioner PaJ;j}as, a tefevision newsman-photographer working out of the Providence, Rhode Island,
office of a New Bedford, Massachusetts, television sta-·
tion, was called to New Bedford on July 30, 1970. to
'r(~port on civil disorders there which involved fires a!ld
other turmoil. He intended to c~er a Black Panther
news conference at that group's lieadquarters fri a
boarded-up sTore. Petitioner found the streets around
the store barricaded, but he ultimately gained entrance
to the area and recorded and photographed a prepared
state e1 t r
b one of the Black Pa1 1er 1 aders at f
about 3:00 p.m. 7
e then as e
mission to re-enter the area. Returning at about 9:00
p.m. that evening. he was allowed to enter and remain
inside Panther headquarters. As a condition of entry,

lA

settled the issue, hnving decided that a newsman's sourcC' of information is to be privileged. Because of this there is no point in
citing Professor WigmorC' nnd other authorities who speak against
the grnnt of such a privilege. The question has been mnny times
debated, and the Lcgi~ lature has spoken. The only question beforethe Court is the con ·t ru clion of the term 'source of information' as
it was intended by the Legislature."
Though the passage itself is somewhat unclear, the surrounding discussion indicates that petitionN was asserting here that the qnestion of whether a common law privilege should be recognized \vas
irrelevant since the legislature had already enacted a statute. In
his earlier disrussion, petitioner had analyzed certain cases in which
the First Amendment argumC'nt was made but indicated that it was
not necessary to reach this question if the statutory phrnsr "source
of information" were interpreted expansively. We do not interpret
this discussion as indicating that petitioner was abandoning his
First Amendment claim if the Court of Appeals dd not agree with
his statutory interpretation argument, and we hold that the constitutional question in Branzburg v. Pound was properly preserved for
review.
7
Petitioner's news films of this event were made available to theBristol County District Attorney. R.., at 4.

\
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Pappas a reed not to disclose anythin he saw or heard
ins1 e t e
e excep an an 1c1pated police raid which
P~ l<oi-this own ," was free to photograph and report. Pappas stayed inside the headquarters for about
three hours, but there was no police raid, and petit.i9E!:r
wrote no story or otherwise revealed what had transPired m the store while he was there. Two months
later, petitioner was summoned before the Bristol County
Grand Jury and appeared, answered questions as to
his name, address, employment, and what he had seen
and heard outside Pa11ther heardquarters, but r~sed to
answer any questions about what had taken pl ce in~
side headquarters while he was there, claiming that
the First Amendment afforded him a privilege to protect confidential informants and their information. A
second summons was then served upon him, again directing him to appear before the Grand Jury and "to
give such evidence as he knows relating to any matters
which may be inquired of on behalf of the commonwealth before . . . the Grand Jury." His motion to
quash on First Amendment and other grounds was denied by the trial judge who, noting the absence of a
statutory newsman's privilege in Massachusetts, ruled
that petitioner had no constitutional privilege to refuse
to divul e to the Grand Jur what he had seen and
heard, i cludin t 1 ent1 y of ersons e ad observed.
. to t 1e upreme JuThe case was reported for deClslOn
8
dicial Court of Massachusetts. The record there did
not include a transcript of the hearing on the motion
to quash nor did it reveal the specific questions petitioner had refused to answer, the expected nature of

I
II

-

8 The case was reported by the superior court directly t o the
Supreme Judicial Court for an interlocutory ruling under Mass .
Gen. Law, c. 278, § 30A and Mass. Gen. Law, c. 231 , § 111, and
the Supreme Judirinl Court's decision appe:u s at Mass. - ,.
266 N . E. 2d 297 (1971) .

..
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his testimony, the nature of the grand jury investigation,
or the likelihood of the grand jury securing the information it sought from petitioner by other means." The
Supreme Judicial Court, hmvever, took "judicial notice
that in July, 1970, there were serious civil dirordcrs
in New Bedford, which involved sft·eet barricades, e~
clusion of the public from certain streets, fires, and similar turmoil. We were told at the arguments that there
was g,g_nfire in certain streets. \V c assume that the
grand jury investigation was an appropriate effort
to discover and indict those responsible for criminal
acts." Mass. - , 266 N. E. 2d, at 299. The Court
then reaffirmed prior Massachusetts holdings that testimonial )rivileo-es 'vere "exce )tional" and "limit~'
stating that " [ t] he pnnCJp e that the public 'has a
right to very man's evidence' " has usually been preferred, in the Commonwealth, to countervailing interests. Ibid. The Court rejected the holding of the
Ninth Circuit in Caldwell v. United States, supra, and "ad-~
here[cl] to the view that there exists no constitutional
newsman's privilege, either qualified or absolute, to refuse to appear and testify before a court or grand jury.l()
-Mass. - , 266 N. E. 2d, at 301-302. Any a#erse
effect upon the free dissemination of ne\YS by virtue of
petitioner's being called to testify was deemed to be

I

n "We do not lul\·c brfore u~ the text of :my specific qurstionR
which Pnppn~ ha~ rcfu~rd to nn~wrr brfore the ~rand jur~·. or any
prtition to hold him for rontempt for hiH rdus:1l. We hnYe only
genrrnl ~tatcmcnts conccrnin~ (a) the inquirirs of the ~r:1nd jmy,
and (b) the mnteri:1lity of the testimony ~ou~ht from Pappas. Therecord docs not ~how the expected nnturc of his testimony or what
likelihood there if' of being able to obtain that testimony from pcr~ons
other than news gntherers.'' Mn~f'. - , 22G N. E. 2d, :1t 299
(footnote omitted).
10
The Court Pxpressly declined to consider. however, appc:1rnnccs
Ma~s.
of newRmen before lc~islativc or admini~trntivc bodies. - , 2GG N. E. 2d, at 303 n. 10.

70-~5 ,
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only "indirect, theoretical, and uncertain."
Mass.
--, 266 N. E. 2d, at 302. The court concluded that
"The ohl!_gation of newsmen ... is th2:._t of every citi~en; ... to appear when summoned, with relevant written or other material when required, and to answer
relevant and reasonable inquiries." Mass. --, 266
N. E. 2d, at 303. The court nevertheless noted that
grand juries were subject to supervision by the presiding judge, who had the duty "to prevent oppressive,
unnecessary, irrelevant, and other improper inquiry and
investigation," to insure that a witness' Fifth Amendment rights were not infringed, and to assess the propriety, necessity, and pertinence of the probable
testimony to the investigation in progress." Ibid. The
burden "·as deemed to be on the witness to establish
the in1propriety of the summons or the questions a"ked.
The denial of the motion to quash ·was affirmed and
we granted a writ of certiorari to petitioner Pappas. 402
U.S. 942 (1971).
United States v. Caldwell, No. 70-57, arose from sub' grand jury in the Northern
poenas issued by a federal
District of California to respondent Earl Caldwell, a
reporter for the New York Times assigned to cover
the Black Panther Party and other black militant groups.
A subpoena duces tecum was served on respondent on
February 2, 1970, ordering him to appear before the
grand jury to testify and to bring with him notes and
11 The Court noted th:-~t "n pre~iding judge mny consider in his
discretion" the nrgumcnl that the u~c of newsmen as wilnes~es is
likely to result in unncccs~nr:v or bmden~ome use of their work
product, l\Iass. - , 266 N. E. 2d, at 304 n. 13, and cautioned
thnt "We do nol ~uggcst that a general investigation of mere political or group aRsociation of per~ons, without substnntial relation
to criminnl event~, may uot be viewed by a judge in a somewhat
different manner from an investigation of particulnr criminal events
Mass. - ,
concerning which a newsmm1 may have knowledge." 266 N. E. 2d, nt 304 n. 14 .

...

I
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tape recordings of interviews ven
tion by officers
1 of
ac
Party concerW,Og the aims purposes, and activities of
that organization. 12 Respondent objected to the scope
of this subpoena, and an agreement between his counsel
and the government attorneys resulted in a continuance. A second subpoena was served on March 16,
'vhich omitted the documentary requirement and simply
ordered Caldwell "to appear . . . to testify before the
Grand Jury." Respondent and his employer, the New
York Times/" moved to quash on the ground that the
unlimited breadth of the subpoenas and the fact that
Caldwell would have to appear in secret before the
grand jury would destroy his working relationship with
the Black Panther Party and "suppress vital First
Amendment freedoms ... by driving a wedge of distrust
and silence between the news media and the militants."
R., at 7. Respondent argued that "so drastic an incursion upon First Amendment freedoms" should not
be permitted "in the absence of a compelling governmental interest-not shown here-in requiring Mr. Caldwell's appearance before the grand jury." Ibid. The
motion was supported by amicus curiae memoranda
from other publishing concerns and by affidavits from
12 The subpoena ordered production of "Notes and tape recordings of interviews covering the period from January 1, 1969, to date,
reflecting statements made for publication by officers and spokesmen for the Black Panthrr Party concerning the aims and purpo es
of said organization and the activities of said organization, its officers, staff, personnel, and members, including specifically but not
limited to interviews given by David Hilliard and Raymond 'Masai'.
Hewitt." R., at 20.
1 3 The New York Times was granted standing to inten·ene as a
party on the motion to qua h the subpoenas. 311 F. Supp., at 359.
It did not file an appeal from the District Court's contempt citation,
and it did not seek certiorari here. It has filed an amicus curiae
brief, however.
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newsmen asserting the unfavorable impact on news
sources of requiring reporters to appear before grand
juries. The Gq,_vernment filed three memoranda in opposition to the motion to quash, each supported by
affidavits. These documents stated that the grand jury
was investigating, among other thmgs, possible viOlations of a num5er of criminal statutes, ~luding 18
U.~. § 871 (threats against the President), 18 U.S. C.
§ 1751 (assassination, attempts to assassin te
n iracy
to assassinate t e Pres1 ent ,
. S. C. § 231 (civil
disordern), 18 0. S. C. § 2101 (interstate travel to incite
a riot), and 18 U.S. C.§ 1341 (mail frauds and s·windles).
It was recited that on November 15, 1969, an officer
of the Black Panther Party made a publicly televised speech in which he had declared that "We will
kill Richard Nixon" and that this threat had been repeated in three subsequent issues of the Party newspaper. R., at 66, 77. Also referred to were various
writings by Caldwell about the Black Panther Party,
including an article published in the New York Times
on December 14, 1969, stating that "[i] n their role as
the vanguard in a revolutionary struggle the Panthers
have picked up guns" and quoting the Chief of Staff
of the =party as declaring that "We advocate the yery
direct overthrow of the Government by way of force
a1~ violence. By picking up guns and moving against
it because we recognize it as being oppressive and in
recognizing that we know that the 0121Y solution to it
is armed struggle [sic]." R., at 62. The Government
al~o stateathat the Chief of Staff of the Party had
been indicted by the grand jury on December 3, 1969,
for uttering threats against the life of the President
in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 871 and that various efforts
had been made to secure evidence of crimes under in' vestigation through tho immunization of persons allegedly associated with the Black Panther Party .

..
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An April 6, the District Court denied the motion to
quash, 311 F. Supp. 358 (ND Cal. 1970), on the ground
that "every person within the jurisdiction of the government" is bound to testify upon being properly
summoned. !d., at :J60 (emphasis in original). Nevertheless, the court accepted respondent's First Amendment arguments to the extent of issuing a' ~rotectivc
orde~' wovidin that althou h respondent must divulge
wl
v · · 1formation hac been giVen to him or publication, he "shall no e reqmrec to revea con c en ial
a~ations, sources or information received, developed
or maintained by him as a professional journalist in
the course of his efforts to gather news for dissemination to the public through the press or other media."
The court held that the First Amendment afforded
respondent a privilege to refuse disclosure of such confidential information until that had been "a showing
by the Government of a compelling and overriding
national interest in requiring Mr. Caldwell's testimony
which cannot be served by any alternative means." 311
F. Supp., at 362.
Subsequently,'' the term of the grand jury expired, a
ne"· grand jury was convened, and a new subpoena
ad testificandum was issued and served on May 22,
1970. A new motion to quash by responclelJt and memorandum in opposition by the Government were filed,
and by stipulation of the parties, the motion was submitted on the prior record. The court denied the motion
to quash, repeating the protective provisions in its prior
order but this time directing CalchYell to appear before
the grand jmy pursuant to the May 22 subpoena. RespollClent refused to appear before the grand jury, and the1
~ Rrspondrnt nppralrcl from the Di~trirt Court'::; April G drninl
of his motion to qun sh on April 17, 1970, nncl the Go\'C•rnmrnt
mo,·ccl to dismiss thnt nppcnl on the ground thnt the order wn s
interlocutory. On Mny 12, 1970, the Ninth Circuit dismi::;secl the
appeal without opinion.
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court issued an order t,o sho''" cause ''"hy he should not be
held in contempt. Upon his further refusal to go before the grand jury, respondent was ordered committed
for contempt until such time as he complied with the
court's order or until the expiration of the term of the
grand jury.
Respondent Caldwell appealed the contempt order,'"
and the Court of Appeals reversed. Viewing the issue
before it as \Yhether Caldwell was required to appear
before the grand jury at all, rather than the scope of
permissible interrogation, the court first determined that
the First Amendment provided a qualified testimonial
privilege to newsmen; in its view, requiring a reporter
like Caldwell to testify would deter his informants from
communicating with him in the future and would cause
him to self-censor his writings in an effort to avoid being
subpoenaed. Absent compelling reasons for requiring (
his testimony, he was held privileged to withhold it.
The court also held, for similar First Amendment reasons, that.Vabsent some s )ecial showino- of necessity by
the Government, a tendance y Caldwell at a secret
·m~ting of t j; grand jmy was something he was privileged to refuse because of the potential impact of such
an appearance on the flow of news to the public. We
granted the United States' petition 'n for certiorari. 402
U. S. 942 (1971).
I
Petitioners Branzburg and Pappas and respondent
Caldwell press First Amendment claims that may be
1
" The Go\·ernment did not file a cross-appeal and did not challenge the ya]idity of the Distric-t Court order in the Court of Appeals.
10 The petition presented a single que~tion: "Whether a newspaper reporter who has ]1ublished articles about an organization can,
under the Fir:;t Amendment, properly refuse to appear before a
grand jury im·estigating po~siblo crimes by members of that
organization who have bccu quoted in tho publii:ihocl articles."
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simply put: that to gather news it is often necessary
to agree either not to identify the source of information published or to publish only part of the facts
revealed, or both; that if the reporter is nevertheless
forced to reveal these confidences to a grand jury, the
source so identified and other confidential sources of
other reporters will be measurably deterred from furnishing publishable information, all to the detriment of
'the free flow of information protected by the First
Amendment. Although p~s do not claim a,n absolute privilege against official interrogation in all circumstances, the assert that the re orter should not be
forced ei
to a Jear or testify before a oTan
ury
1til and unless sufficient grounds are shown
or at tri
'for believin that the reporter possesses infor
ion
relevant to a crime t e grand jury is mvest1gatit
hat
the informa IOn
as 1s unavmlable from

-

y 1e 1sc osure.
Pnnc1pall)Frelied upon arc prior cases emphasizing the
importance of the First Amendment guarantees to individual development and our system of representative
government/ 7 decisions requiring that official action with
adverse impact on First Amendment rights be justified by a public interest that is "compelling" or "paramount," 1 8 and those precedents establishing the principle
Curtis Publishing Co . Y. Butts, 388 U. S. 130, 145 (1967)
(opinion of Harlan, ,T.); N ew York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254,
270 (1964); Talley v. Calijomia, 362 U.S. 60, 64-65 (1960); Bridges
v. California, 314 U. S. 2.52, 263 (1941); Grosjean v. Ame1ican Press
Co., 297 U. S. 233 , 250 (1936); N ear v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697,
722 (1931).
18
NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 433 (1963); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516, 530 (1945); D eGregory v. Attorney General of
N ew Hampshire, 383 U. S. 825, 829 (1966); Bates v. Little Rock,
361 U. S. 516, 524 (1960); Schneider v. Stat e, 308 U. S. 147, 161
(1939); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449, 464 (1958) .
17
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that justifiable governmental goals may not be achieved
by unduly broad means having an unnecessary impact
on protected rights of speech, press, or association. 10
The heart of the claim is that the burden on news
gathering resulting from compelling reporters to disclose confidential information outweighs any public interest in obtaining the information. 20
We do not question the significance of free speech,
press or assembly to the country's welfare. Nor is it
suggested that news gathering does not qualify for First
Amendment protection; without some protection for
seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be
eviscerated. But this case involves no intrusions u on
speech O"r'assembly, no )rior rcstram or restnctwn on
whaf tfie press may publish a~ ~ express or implied
command that the press publish what it prefers to'Withhold. No exaction or tax for tfie privilege of publishiiig,"" and no penalty, civil or criminal, related to the
content of published material is at issue here. The
use of confidential sources by the press is not forbidden
or restricted ; reporters remain free to seek news from

I

1
°Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U. S. 51, 56 (1965); NAACP v.
Alabama, 377 U. S. 288, 307 (1964); Martin v. City of Struthers,
319 U. S. 141, 147 (1943); Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U. S. 11, 18
(1966).
20
There has been a great deal of writing in recent years on the
existenre of a newsman'~ constitutional right of nondisclosure of
confidential information. See, e. g., Beaver, The Newsman's Code,
The Claim of Privilege, and Everyman's Right to Evidence, 47 Ore.
L. Rev. 243 (1968); Guest & Stanzler, The Constitutional Argument for Newsmen Concealing Their Sources, 64 Nw. U. L. Rev.
18 ( 1969) ; Note, Reporters and Their Sources: The Constitutional
Right to a Confidential Relationship, 80 Yale L. J. 317 (1970);
Note, The Newsman's Privilegr: Government Investigations, Criminal Prosecutions and Private Litigation, 58 Calif. L. Rev. 1198
(1970); No1e, The Right of the Press to Gather Information, 71
Col. L. Rev. 838 (1971); Nelson, The Newsmen's Privilege Against
Di~closure of Confidential SoUJ·res of Information, 24 Vane!. L. Rev ..
667 (1971).
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any source by means within the law. No attempt is \
made to require the press to publieh its sources of information or indiscriminately to disclose them on request.
The sole issue before us is the obligation of reporters
to respond to grand .1ury subpoenas as other citizens
.£!.o and to answer uestions relevant to an investl ation
into t 1e commission
1e. Qitizens generally are
not constitutiQ_nally immune from grand. jury suQ_poenas;
and neither the FirSt.. Amendment nor other constitutional provision protects the avet:a"ge citizen from d"sclosing to a gran .Jury m ormation t 1at he has received
in conhdence.'1 1 •I'Jte clanft 1s, 'however, tl'i1tt reporters
arc exempt from these obligations because if forced to
respond to subpoenas and identify their sources or disclose other confidences, their informants will refuee or
be reluctant to furnish nmYsworthy information in the
future. This asserted hurden on news gathering is said
to make compelled testimony from newsmen constitutionally suspect and to require a privileged position for
them.
It is clear that the Firet Amendment docs not invali- l
date every incident";\ burdemng of the press that may
result from the enforcement of civil or criminal statutes
of general a )hcability. U ndcr prior cases, othenYisc
va 1c aws serving substantial public interests may be
enforced against the press as against others, despite

I

I

21

\

"ln grnrral. thrn, the mrrc fact that a communirntion was made
in cxprc~s confidenrc, or in the implied confidence of a ronfidcnti:tl
reifltion, doc~ not create a privilege. . . . No pledge of privncy nor
oath of ,;ccrecy ran avail again~t demand for the truth in n court
of justice." 8 .J. Wigmore, Evidcnre §22SG (MeN aught on cd. 19Gl).
This was not always the rule at common lnw, howe1·er. Jn 17th
rcntury Englnnd, the obligation~ of honor nmong gentlemen were
orcn~ionally recognized a~ pri1·ileging from rompul~or.v di~closmc
informntion obtained in exchange for n promise of ronfidcnrc. Sec
Bulstrod v. Lethmere, Freem. r. 5 (1G75); Lord GrC'ys 1'rial, 9 How.
St. Tr. 127 (1682).
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the possible burden that may be imposed. The Court
has emphasized that "[t]he publisher of a newspaper
has no special immunity from the application of general laws. He has no special privilege to invade the
rights and liberties of others." Associated Press v. Labor
Board, 301 U. S. 103, 132- 133 (1937). It was there
held that the Associated Press, a news-gathering
and disseminating organization, was 11ot exempt from
the requirements of the National Labor Relations Act.
The holding was reaffirmed in Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 192-193 (1946), where
the Court rejected the claim that applying the Fair
Labor Standards Act to a ne"·spaper publishing business would abridge the freedom of press guaranteed
by the First Amendment. See also Mabee v. White
Plains P'ublishing Co., 327 U.S. 178 (1946). Associated
Press v. U11ited Stales, 326 U. S. 1 (1945), similarly
overruled assertions that the First Amendment precluded application of the Sherman Act to a ne\YS
gathering and disseminating organization. Cf. Indiana
Fmmers Guide Co. v. Prai1-ie Farmers Co., 293 U. S.
265, 276 (1934); Cit?'zen Publishing Co. v. United States,
304 U.S. 131, 139 (1969); Lorain Journal Co. v. United
States, 342 U.S. 143, 155-156 ( 1951). Likewise, a ne\vspaper may be subjected to nondiscriminatory forms of
general taxation. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297
U. ~. 233, 250 (1936); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319
u. s. 105, 112 (1943).
The prevailing view is that the press is not free with
impunity to publish everything and anything it desires
to publish. Although it may deter or regulate what
is said or published, the press may not circulate knowing or reckless falsehoods damaging to private reputation without subjecting itself to liability for damages,
including punitive damages, or even criminal prosecution. See New York 'Pimes v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254,
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292 (1964); Garrison Y. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 64, 74
(1964); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U. S. 130,
147 (1967) (opinion of Harlan, J. ,); Monitor Patriot
Co. v. Roy, 401 U. S. 265, 277 (1971). A newspaper
or a journalist may also be punished for contempt of
court, in appropriate circumstances. Craig v. Harney,
331 U. S. 367, 377-378 (1947).
It has generally been held that the First Amendment \
does not guarantee the press a constitutional right of
special access to information not available to the public
generally. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U. S. 1, 16- 17 (1965);
New York Times Co. v. United States, supra, at 728- 730
(STEWART, J., concurring); 1'ribune Review Publishing
Co. v. Thomas, 254 F. 2cl 883, 885 (CA3 1958); In the
111atter of United Pre;ss Assns. v. Valente, 308 N. Y.
71, 77, 123 N. E. 2d 777, 778 (1954). In Zemel v.
Rusk, supra, for example, the Court sustained the Government's refusal to validate passports to Cuba even
though that restriction "rendered less than wholly free
the flow of information concerning that country." The
ban on travel was held constitutional, for "the right
to speak and publish docs not carry with it the unrestrained right to gather information." I d., at 17. ""
Despite the fact that news gathering may be hampered, the press is regularly excluded from grand jury
proceedings, our own conferences, the meetings of other
official bodies gathered in executive session, and the
meetings of private organizations. Newsmen have no
constitutional right of access to the scenes of crime or

l

22 "There are few restrictions on action which could not be clothed
by ingenious argument in the garb of decreased data flow. For
example, the prohibition of unauthorized entry into the White House
diminishes the citizen's opportunities to gather information he might
find relevant to his opinion of the way the country is being run, but
that does not make entry into the White House a First Amendment
right." 381 U.S., at 16-17.
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disaster when the general public is excluded, and they
may be prohibited from attending or publishing information about trials if such restrictions are necessary to
assure a defendant a fair trial before an impartial tribunal. In Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U. S. 333 (1966),
for example, the Court reversed a state court conviction where the trial court failed to adopt "stricter rules
governing the use of the courtroom by newsmen as
Sheppard's counsel requested," neglected to insulate witnesses from the press, and made no "effort to control
the release of leads, information and gossip to the press
by police officers, witnesses, and the counsel for both
sides." !d., at 358. "[T]he trial court might well
have proscribed extrajudicial statements by any lawyer,
party, witness, or court official which divulged prejudicial matters . . . ." I d., at 361. See also Estes v.
Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 539-540 (1965); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U. S. 723, 726 (1963).
It is thus not surprising that the great weight of authority is that newsmen are note~ )t fromthe normal
duty o appearmg_ e ore a grand jury and answering
questions relevant to a cnmmal mvestigation. At com~aw, cou£!s consistentlt refused' to recognize the
existence of any privilege authorizin a newsman to
refuse to re,Y.ea con en 1a m _gqp.ation to a e;rand jury.
See, e. t;' Ex parte Lawrence, 116 Cal. 298, 48 P. 124
( 1897) ; Plunkett v. Hamilton, 136 Ga. 72, 70 S. E. 781
(1911); Clein v. State, 52 So. 2d 117 ( ~. 1950); In re
Grunow, 84 N. J. L. 235, 85 A. 1011 (1913); People
ex rel. Mooney v. Sheriff, 269 N. Y. 291, 199 N. E.
415 (1936); Joslyn v. People, 67~1. 297, 184 P. 375
(1919); Adams v. Associated Press, 46 F. R. D. 439
(SD ~ - 1969); Brewster v. Boston Herald-Traveler
Corp., "'20 F. R. D. 416 (Mass. 1957). See generally
Annot., 7 A. L. R. 3d 591 (1966). In 1958, a newsgatherer asserted for the first time that the First Amend-

-
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mont privilcgeu confidential information from public
disclosure pursuant to a subpoena issued in a civil suit,
'-Garland v. Torre, 259 F. 2d 545 (CA2), cert. denied,
358 U. S. 910 ( 1958), but the claim was denied, and this
argument has been almost uniformly rejected since then,
although there are occasional dicta that, in circumstances not presented. a newsman might be excused.
In re Goodfader, 45 Haw. 317, 367 P. 2d 472 (1961); In
re Taylor, 412 Pa. 32, 193 A. 2d 181 (1963); State v.
Buchanan, 250 Ore. 244, 436 P. 2cl 729, ccrt denied,
392 U. S. 905 (1968): Vi Murphy v. Colorado,-- Colo.
- , cert. denied, 365 U. S. 843 (1961) (unreported, discussed in In re Goodfader, supra, 45 Haw., at 366, 367
P. 2d, at (Mizuha, J., dissenting)). These courts
have a )lied the )resum )tion against the existence of
an asserted testimonial privilege, Unite
ta es v. Bryan,
339 U. S. 323, 331 ( 1950), and have concluded that the
First Amendment interest '";tsserted b the news1;:;n
\\"aS ou we1g 1e
y the genera o ligation of a citizen to
appear 6etore a grand jury or at trial, pursuant to a
subpoena, and giVe \Yhat information he possesses. The
opinions of the state courts in Bra.nzburg and Pappq.s
are typical of the prevailing view, although a few recent
cases, such as Caldwell, have recognized and given effect
to some form of constitutional newsman's privilege. See
Slate v. Knops, 49 Wis. 2d 647, 183 N. W. 2d 93 (1971)
(dictum); Al·ioto v. Cowles Communication, Inc., C. A.
52150 (ND Cal. 1069); People v. Dohrn, No. 69- 3808
(Cook County, Ill., Cir. Ct. 1970).
The prevailing constitutional view of the ne\vsman's
privilege is very much rooted in the ancient role of the
grand jury '"hich has the dual function of determini11g
if there is probable cause to believe that a crime has
been committed and of protecting citizens against un-

J
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founded criminal prosecutions."" Grand JUry proceedings are constitutionally mandated for the institution of
federal criminal prosecutions for capital or other serious
crimes. The Fifth Amendment provides that "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment
of a Grand Jury . . . . " "4 The adoption of the grand
jury "in our Constitution as the sole method of preferring charges in serious criminal cases shows the high
place it held as an instrument of justice." Costello v.
United Slates, 350 U. S. 359, 362 (1956). Although
state systems of criminal procedure differ greatly among
themselves, the grand jury is similarly guaranteed by
many state constitutions and plays an important role
in fair and effective law enforcement in the overwhelming majority of the States."" Because its task is to
~a "Ilistoricnll~·,

fthe ~rand j11r~·1
.. ha~ been regarded ns a
to the innocrnt agninst hast~·. mnlirious and oppres~iYe pcr8rrution; it sen·es the invnluable function in our society
of standing between the accu~er and thr nccusrd ... to determine
whether n chnrge i~ fo11nded upon renson or w:1R dictated h~· nn
intimirlnting powrr or b~r mnlice and personal ill will." Wood v.
Georgia, :370 U. S. 375, :i90 (1962).
~ 4 It hns bren held that "infnmous" puniHhmrnts includr confinement ::~t hnrd lnbor, United States v. Moreland, 258 U. S. 433
(1922); incnrccrntion in a penitentinry, Mackin v. United States,
117 U. S. 348 (1886); and imprimnmrnt for more than a year.
Barkman \'.Sanford, 162 F. 2d 592 (CA5), cert. demrcl, 332 U.S.
816 (1G47). Feel. Rule Crim. Proc. 7 (n) hns rodified the~e holding~: "An offen~e which mny be puni~hrd by death shall be prosecuted by indictment. An offen~e whirh mny be punishrrl by impri~onment for a term exceeding one ycnr or at hard labor shall
be pro~ecutrd b~· indictment, or if indictment is waived, it may be
prosecuted by information. Any other offen~e may be proserutrd by
indictment or information."
2
" Although indictment by grand jury is not pnrt of the due
prore~s of law guaranteed to State criminnl defendants by the Four11rim:uy

~ecurity
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inquire into the existence of possible criminal conduct
and to return only well-founded indictments, its im·estigativc powers arc necessarily board. "It is a grand inquest. a body with po"·ers of investigation and inquisition, the scope of whose inquiries is not to be limited
narrowly by questions of propriety or forecasts of the
probable result of the investigation, or by doubts
whether any particular individual will be found 11roperly
subject to an accusation of crime." Blair v. United
States, 250 U.S. 273, 282 (1919). Hence the grand jury's
authority to subpoena witnesses is not only historic. id.,
at 279-281, but essential to its task. Although the
powers of the grand jury are not unlimited and are
subject to the supervision of a judge. the long standing
principle that "the public has a right to every man's
evidence," except for those persons protected by a constitutional, common law, or statutory privilege, United
States v. Bryan, 339 U. S. 323, 331 (1950); Blackmer v.
United States, 284 U. S. 421, 438 (1932); 8 J. Wigmore,
Evidence § 2192 (McSuughton cd. 1961), is particularly
applicable to grand jury procecdings. 20
teenth Amendment, Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516 (1884), a
recent study reveals that 32 States re(]uire that certain kinds of criminal prosecutions be initiated by indictment. Spain, The Grand
Jury, Pa st and Present: A Survey, 1 Am. Crim. L. Q. 119, 126-142
(1963). In the 18 States in which the prosecutor may proceed by
information, the grand jury is retained as an alternative means of
invoking the criminal process and as an investigative tool. Ibid.
26
Jerrmy Bentham vividly illustrated this maxim:
"Arr mrn of the first rank and considrration, are mrn high in officr,
men whose time is not lc~s valuable to the public than to themsclves ,-are such men to be forced to (]nil their business, their fnnctions, and what is more than all, their plea su re, at the beck of rvery
idle or mahcious adversary, to dance attendance upon every petty
cause? Yes, as far as it i:c: necessary,-they and everybody! . . .
Were the Prince of Wales, the Archbishop of Canterbury, and the
Lord High Chancellor, to be passing by in the same coach while a
chimney-sweeper and a barrow-woman were in dispute about a
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A number of States have provided newsmen a statutory imvilege
vary-ing breadth/ 7 but ihe majority
h"aVe not done
and none ha-;"becn provided by federal
28
statute.
Until now the only testimonial privilege for
unofficial witnesses that is rooted in the Federal Constitution is the Fifth Amendment privile e a ainst compelled self-incrimination.
e are as e to create another
b~ inter12retmg the First Amendment to grant newsmen
a testimonial privilege that other citizens do not enjoy.

~fL?d· b

or
so,

--

halfpennyworlh of apples, and the chimney-sweeper or the barrowwoman were to think proper to call upon them for their evidence,
could they refuse it? No, most certainly." 4 The Works of Jeremy
Bentham 320 (Bowring c:>d. 1843).
In United States v. Bun·, 25 F. Cas. 30, 34 (Cir. Ct. D. Va. 1807)
No. 14,692d), Chief Just ice Marshall, sitting on Circuit, OJ)ined
that in prOJ)('r circumstances a subpoena could be issued to the
President of the United States.
27 Thus far, 17 States have provided some type of statutory protection to a newsman's collfiden tial sources:
"Ala. Code Recompiled Til. 7, § 370 (1960); Alaska Stat. § 09.25.150 (1967, 1970 Cum. Supp.); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-2237 (1969
Supp.); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 43-917 (1964); Cal. Evid. Code Ann.
§ 1070 (West 1966); Ind. Ann. Stat. § 2-1733 (1968); Ky. Rev.
Stat. § 421.100 (1969); La. Rev. Stat. § 45:1451-54 (1970 Cum.
Supp); Md. Ann. Code Art. 35, § 2 (1971); Mich. Stat. Ann.
§ 28.945 (1) (1954); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. Tit. 93, ch. 601-2
(1964); Nev. Rev. Stat. ~ 48.087 (1969); N. J. Stat. Ann. Tit. 2A
ch. 84A, § 21, 29 (Supp. 1969); N. M. Stat. Ann. § 20-1-12.1 (1953,
1967 Rev.); N. Y. Civ. Rights Law § 79-h (McKinney 1970); Ohio
Rev. Code Ann. § 2739.12 (1953); Pa. Stat. Ann. Tit. 28, § 330
(1958, 1970 Cum. Supp.)."
28 Such legislation has been introduced, however.
See, e. g.,
S. 3352, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); H. R. 16328, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess. (1970); H. R. 16704, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); S. 1851,
88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963); H. R. 8519, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1963); H. R. 7787, 88th Cong., 1st Se::;s. (1963); S. 965, 86th
Cong., M Sess. (1959); H. R. 355, 86th Cong., 1st Scss. (1959).
For a general annlysis of proposed congressional legi~lation, see
Staff of Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Scss.,
The Ncw~man's Pri1·ilegc (Comm. Print 1966).

1
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overnment, an t 1e r
ur
la s an im )Ortant,
n t 1e
constltutiona y mandated role in th' )ro ess.
recorc s now e ore us, we perceive 110 basis for holding
that the public interest in law enforcement and in ensuring effective grand jury proceedings is insufficient to
override the consequential, but uncertain, burden on
news gathering which is said to result from insisting
that reporters, like other citizens, respond to relevant
questions put to them in the course of a valid grand jury
investigation or criminal trial.
This conclusion itself involves no restraint on what
newspapers may publish or on the type or quality

l

~DThe crrntion of nrw tr~timoninl pri,·ilq~rR hns been mrt with
di;f:1\'or by commrntntor" sincr surh pri,·ilrgcs obstruct the ~rnrrh
for truth. Wigmore conclrmn~ such j)fi,·ilrgrs n~ "~o mnny clrrogn-·
1ion.· from :1 po"iti\·e grnrraJ rule rthnt e\·cryone i~ obfigntrcl 10
trstif~· whrn proprrly summonrd]" nne! n~ "ob~tactcr"l to the ndmini"t.mtion of ju~ti<"r." S Wigmorr, On E,·idcncc 70, 73 (McNnughton rd. 1961). His rritirism th;tt "all privileges of exemJ)tion from
th-is general duty are eX('('ptional :me! nre thrrrfore to be cli~rouu
trnanrrd," id., at 73 (emph:1"is in originnl) ha s been fr('(]tH'ntly
crhord. Morgan, "Forewnrd," Model Code of EYidcnrc 22-30
( 1942); Clw frr, C:owrnmrnt nne! J\b~s Comnmnirntion~ 496-497
(19.t7): ABA Commiitrr on Impro, ·r mrnt~ in thr L11w of EYidence,
Report, 6~ A. n. A. Rq)ortH 595 (1938); McCormick, On Evid<'nce
150 (1972); Ch:1frr, "PriYilrgrd Commnnirntion~: Ts .Ju::'tirc Srn·rd
or Ob~tmrted by Closing fhr Doctor'R Mouth on the Witur"s Stand?,"
52 Yah' L. J. 607 (194:~); Ladd, "Pri1·ilr~r~," 1969 L:nv and th~
Social Order 555, 556 (1960); 58 Am . .Jur., '\Yitne~~es §54() (19.t8);
97 C . .J. S., Witne,~r8 § 259 (1957); McMann v. Srcurities and E:rchange Commission, 87 F. 2d 377, 378 (CA2 1938) (L. Hanel , J.). ~
NC'ithrr thr ALI'~ .Model Codr of E1·idcnce (1942) , the National
Confrrence of tomn11~~10ners on Uniform State Lnws' Uniform Rulr~
of Evidence (1053) , nor the Propo~rd Rulrs of Eviclrncr for th ~
United States Courts and MngistrntC'~ (rev. rd . 1971) hnve included
n. newsman's priYilege.

tC
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of information reporters may seek to acquire, nor does
it threaten the vast bulk of confidential relationships be-
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forbidden to all other persons.
proposition

To assert the contrary

"is to answer it, since it involves in its very statement the contention that the freedom of the press
is a freedom to do· wrong with impunity, and implies the right to frustrate and defeat the discharge
·Of those governmental duties upon the performance
of which the freedom of all, including that of the
press, depends . . . it suffices to say that, however
complete is the right of the press to state public
things and discuss them, that right, as every other
right enjoyed in human society, is subject to the
restraints which separate right from wrong." Toledo
Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 402, 419420 (1918).'10

I

Thus, we cannot seriously entertain the notion thatthe First Amendment protects a newsman's agreement
to conceal the criminal conduct of his source, or evidence thereof, on the theory that it is better to write
about crime than to do something about it. Insofar
as any re )Orter in these cases underto k not to reveal
the cr ne e itnessed, his claim of
or testif abo
priv1 ege under the First mendment presents no substantial question. Congress, state le islatures or state
courts under their o;n-oonstitutwns may arrive at ifferent views, bul for the purpose of federal constitution.al
aajudication, we do not consider the crimes of news

-

80 Tho holding in this case involved a construction of the Contempt Act 'of 1831, 4 Stat. 487, which permitted ·ummary trial of
contempts "so ncar [to the court] as to obstruct the administration
of justice." The Court held that the Act required only that the conduct have "a tendency to prevent and obstruct the discharge of
judicial duty." 247 U. S., at 419. This view was overruled and the
Act given a much narrower reading in Nye v. United States, 313
U. S. 33, 47-52 (1941). See Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U. S. 194, 205206 (1968).

[~
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sources any less reprehensible and threatening to t~
pubhc mterest when witnessed by a reporter than when
· they are not.
"There ""';emain those situations where a source is not
engaged m criminal conduct b~ has information suggesting Iilegal conduct by ot~ers. Newsmen frequently
receive informatiOn from such sources pursuant to a
tacit or express agreement to withhold the source's
name and suppress any information that the source·
wishes not published. Such informants presumably
desire anonymity in order to avoid being entangled
as a witness in a criminal trial ·or grand jury investigation. They may fear that disclosure will threaten their
job security or personal safety or that it will simply
result in dishonor or embarrassment.
As we have indicated, the argument is that if a source
is identified, he and similar informants having evidence
of wrongdoing will no longer reveal information to the
press and that although forcing reporters to testify
may help or even be crucial in specific cases, the public
and law enforcement will both be deprived of information furnished by confidential sources in the future. The
point is urgently pressed; but as a constitutional
matter, the interest in fair and effective law enforce) ment cannot be so easlly overridden.
We decline to·
construe the First Amendment to protect agreemenj:,s
by re orters to conceal facts relevant to the investi ation of crime by gran iuries.
The argument that the flow of news will be diminished by compelling reporters to aid the grand jury
in a criminal investigation is not irrational, nor are·
the records before us silent on the matter. But we 1
remain unclear how often and to what extent informers
are actually deterred from furnishing information when
newsmen are forced to testify before a grand jury. The
available data indicates that some newsmen rely a great

I
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deal on confidential sources and that some informants
are particularly sensitive to the threat of exposure and
may be silenced if it is held by this Court that, ordinarily, newsmen must testify pursuant to subpoenas,"t
but the evidence fails to demonstrate that there would
bel!;_ sig1;ificant constriction ol the flow of news to the
PJlblic if this Court reaffirms the prior common law
and constitutional rule regarding the testimonial obligations of newsmen. Estimates of the inhibiting effect
of such subpoenas on the willingness of informants to
make disclosures to newsmen are widely divergent and
to a great extent speculative. ~ It would be difficult
to canvass the views of the informants themselves;
surveys of reporters on this topic are chiefly opinio11s
of predicted informant behavior and must be viewed
in the light of the professional self-interest of the intervimvees. ~3 Reliance by the press on confidential in2

:;, Rrspondcnt Ca ldwe ll nttachcd a numbrr of nfTidavit s from
prominrnt newsmen to hi.;; initia l motion to quash which detail the
cxpcricncrs of such journali ~t s nftcr they hn vc been sub]1ocnnrd. R .,
[) t 22- 61.
2
R Cf., e. g., thr rc~ ult s of n s tud~' conduetrd hy Gur~ t & Stanzler ,
which npprnrs as an appendix to thrir article, "The Constitutional
Arf.!ument for Ne w~mrn Conernling thrir Somcr~ , " 64 Nw. U. L.
R ev. 18, 57 (1969). A numbrr of e ditor~ of daily J1cwspn]1Crs of
Yarying circulation were as ked the quc~tion , "Excluding one- or
t\ro-srntenre gossip i1rm ~ , on 11H' m·cragr how many stori es bn sed
on information rccrin•d in confidrncr nrc published in your paper
rnch ~~enr? Vrry rough e~ timat e ." Answrrs varied ~ ignifir::tnl'ly e. g.,
"Virtually innum erable," Tucson Dnily Citizrn (41 ,969 daily circ.),
"Too mnny to rrmembrr," Los Angelo~ Hcarld-Examiner (718,221
daily eire.) , "Ocrasionnlly," Dcm·er Post (252,084 daily circ .),
"R arely" CJc,·elancl Pla in Drnlrl· (370 ,499 daily circ.) , "Vcry rare,
some politics," Orrgon .Journnl (146,403 daily circ. ) . This study did
not purport to measure tho cxtrnt of dctrrrenre of informant s caused
by subpoena s to the ])]'C'S~.
33
In his Press Subpoena s : An Empirical and Legal Ana l y~ i s 6- 12
( 1971), Prof. Blasi di~cnsscs these methodological problems. Prof.
Blasi's survey found that slightly more than half of the 975 re-
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formants docs not mean that all such sources 'vill in
fact dry up because of the later possible appearance
of the newsman before a grand jury. The reporter,
of course, may uevcr be called and if he objects to
testifying, the prosecution may not insist. Also, the
relationship of many informants to the press is a symbiotic one which is unlikely to be greatly inhibited by
the threat of subpoena: quite often, such informants
arc members of a minority political or cultura.l group
which relies heavily on the media. to propagate its views,
publicize its aims, and magnify its exposure to the public.
Moreover, grand juries conduct secret proceedings.
and law enforcement officers arc themselves experienced
in dealing with informers and ha.ve their own methods
for protecting them without interference with the effective administration of justice. There is little before
us indicating that informants whose interest in avoiding exposure is that it may theaten job ersonal safety
or peace of mind, would in fact, be in a. ·worse position, or would think they would be, if they risked
placing their trust in public officials as well as reporters. W c doubt if the informer who prefers anonymity but is sincerely interested in furnishing evidence of
crime will always or very often be deterred by the prospect of dealing with those public authorities characteristically charged with the duty to protect the pubil.c
interest as well as his.
Accepting the fact, however, that a11 undetermined
number of informants not themselves implicated in crime
"·ill nevertheless, for whatever reason, refuse to talk
to newsmen if they fear identification by a reporter
~,JJ

porters questionlsa icl that they relied on regular confidential sources
for at lea st 10% of their stories. !d., at 21. Of this group of reporters, only 8% were able to say with some certainty that their
profe~ s ionnl functioning lwei been adversely affected by tho threat
of subpoena; another 11 % were not certain whether or not they had
been adversely affected. !d., at 53.
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m an official investigation , ''"e cannot accc11t the
argument that the public interest in possible future
news about crime from undisclosed, unverified sources
must take precedence over the public interest in pursuing and prosecuting those crimes reported to the pre~~
by informants and in thus deterring the commission of
such crimes in the future.
We note first that th~_yrivilege claimed is that of the (
reporter, not the informant, and that if the authonties
independently identify the informant; neither his own
reluctance to testify nor the objection of the newsm.an
would shield him from grand jury inquiry, whatever
the impact on the flow of news or on his future usefulness as a secret source of information. More important, it is obvious that agreements to conceal information
relevant to commission of crime have very little to recommend them from the standpoint of public policy.
Historically, the common law recognized a duty to raise
the "hue and cry" and report felonies to the authorities.a4 Misprision of a felony- that is, the concealment of a felony clwhrch a man knows but never assented
to so as to become either principal or accessory," 4 Blackstone, Commentaries, c. 9, *121 (Lewis eel. 1902),
was a common law crime.a" The first Congress passed
a statute, 1 Stat. 113, as amended, 35 Stat. 1114, 62
s• See Statute of WestminiRter the First , 3 Edw. I , c. IX , at 43
(1275) ; Statut e of Winchester, 13 Edw. I , c. VI, at 114-115 (1285);
Sheriffs Act of 1887, 50 & 51 Viet ., c. 55, § 8 (1) ; 4 Blackstone, Commentaries, c. 21 , f:·293-·X·295 (LewiR ed. 1902) ; 2 Holdsworth , History
of English Law 80-81, 101-102 (3d cd. 1927) ; 4 ibid., at 521- 522.
35 See, e. g., Scrape's Case, 3 Co. Inst. 36 (1415) ; R ex v. Cowper,
5 Mod. Rep. 206, 87 E. R . 611 (1696); Proceedings under a Special
Commission for the County of York, 31 Stat., Tr. 969 (1813); Sykes
v. Director of Public Prosecutions, 3 W. L. R. 371 (19Gl). Sec also
2 R.ich. III, c. 22 ( - ) ; Art 5 and 6 Edw. VI, c. 11 (1512) .

-
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·Stat. 684, which is still in effect, defining a federa.l crime
of misprision:
"Whoever, having knowledge of the actual commission of a felony cognizable by a court of the
United States, conceals and does not as soon as
possible make known the same to some judge or
other person in civil or military authority under
the United States shall be [guilty of misprison] ."
18 U. S. C. § 4.
This statute has been construed, however, to require
both knowledge of a crime and some affirmative act of
concealment or participation. Bratton v. United States,
73 F. 2d 795 (CAlO 1934); United States v. Farrar, 38
F. 2d 515, 516 (Mass. 1930), aff'd on other grounds,
281 U. S. 613 ( 1930); United States v. N onnan, 391
F. 2d 212 (CA6 1968), cert. denied, 390 U. S. 1014
(1968); Lancey v. United States, 356 F. 2d 407 (CA9),
cert. denied, 385 U. S. 922 (1966). But whatever the
reach of the act, it is apparent from the statute, as
well as from our history and that of England, that concealment of crime and agreements to do so are not
looked upon with favor. Such conduct deserves no·
encom.iu.m and until now has carried no First Amendment credentials. We decline at this juncture to con- \
strue the Amendment to denigrate the duty of the·
citizen, whether reporter or informer, to respond to
grand jury subpoena and answer relevant questions put
to him.
We are unimpressed with the argument that the freedom of the press guaranteed by the First Amendment
must place newsmen beyond grand jury subpoena in order
to protect their right 1o publish only that part of the news
their sources care to have the public read. Of course,
the press may print or not print whatever news it
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pleases, but the right to withhold news is not equivalent to a First Amendment exemption from the ordinary duty of all other citizens to furnish relevant
information to a grand jury performing an important
pu'lillc function. Private restraints on the flow of information have never before been accorded First Amendment protection. As Mr. Jusbce Black aecla.red m
another context, "Freedom of the Press from governmental interference under the First Amendment does
not sanction repression of that freedom by private interests." Associated Press v. Um:ted States, 326 U. S.
1' 20 ( 1945) .
Neither arc we now convinced that a virtually impenetrable constitutional shield, beyond legislative or
judicial control, sh,guld be forged to protect a private
system of informers operated by the press to re )0 ·t on
crmuna conduct, a system t.1at vYoulc be unaccountable
to me public, would pose a threat to the citizen's justifiable expectations of privacy, and would equally pro. teet well-intentioned informants and those who for pay
or other\\'ise betray their trust to their emplo er or
assoCia. es.
1c pu 1c 1roug 1 1 s e ectcd and appointed
law eniorcemcnt officers regularly utilizes informers, and
in proper circwnstances may assert a priYilege against
disclosing the identity of these informers. But
"The purpose of the privilege is the furtherance
and protection of the public interest in effective
law enforcement. The privilege recognizes the obligation of citizens to communicate their knowledge
of the commission of crimes to law-enforcement
officials and, by preserving their anonymity, encourages them to perform that function." Rovario
v. United States, 353 U. S. 53, 59 ( 1957).
Such informers enjoy no constitutional protection, however. Their testimony is a.vailable to the public when
desired by grand juries or at criminal trials; their iden-
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tity cannot be concealed from the defendant when it
is critical to his case. Rovario v. United States, supra;
McCray v. Illinm·s, 386 U. S. 300, 310 ( 1067); Smith v.
Illino·is, 390 U. S. 120, 131 (1968); Alford v. United
States, 282 U. S. 687, 693 (1931). Clearly, this system
is not impervious to control by the judicia.r y and the
decision \Yhether to unmask an informer or to continue
to profit by his ano11ymity is in public. not private,
hands. We think that it should remain there and that
public authorities should retain the options of either
insisting on the informer's testimony relevant to the
prosecution of crime or of seeking the benefit of further
information that his exposure might prevent.
We arc admonished that refusal to provide a Firs ·~
Amendment reporter's privilege will undermine the free- "
dom of the press to collect and disseminate news. But
this is not the lesson history teaches us. As n;t;i
preVwusly, the common law recognized
such privilege. and the constitutional argument \Vas not even
asserted until 1958. From the beginning of our country the press has operated without constitutional protection for press informants. There is nothing persuasive ---~ -,..(..0
before us indicating that the free press has so far suf-. ~~
fered or that either reporters or their sources have
found the duty to respond to subpoenas an unaccept- ~.~
able deterrent. To the contrary, t 1e )ress has :flour- ~~~
i~hed and does not seem to have found the ex1s m

1;0

,qr-f

aa Though the con~( itution:1l argument for a newsman's privilege
has been put forward very recently, newsmen have contended for a
number of years thnt surh n privilege wa::: dc~ irabl e. See, e. (f., Sicbert & Ryniker, Editor and Publi~hcr 36-37 (Sept. 1, 1934) ; Bird
& Men ·in, The New~ papc r and Society 567 (1942) . The firBt newsman's privilege s1n tute wa ~ enacted by Maryland in 1896, and currently is coclificcl ns l\1cl. Ann. Code Art. 35, § 2 (1971).
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It is said tha.t currently press subpoenas have multiplied,37 that mut~l ClTstrust and tenswn between press
ana:-officialdom have increased, that reporting styles
have changed and that there is now more need for confidential sources, particularly 'vVherc the press seeks
news about minority cultural and political groups or dis'sident organizations suspicious of the law and police
officials. These developments, even if true, arc treacherous grounds for a far-reaching interpretation of the
First Amendment fastening a nationwide rule on courts,
grand juries and prosecuting officials everywhere. The
obligation to testify in response to grand jury subpoenas
will not affect those sources not involved with criminal conduct and without information relevant to grand
jury investigations. And for those who are in those
special categories, we cannot hold at present that the
Constitution places them either above the la>v or beyond its reach.
We do not disregard those cases requiring the State's
interest to be "compelling,'' or "paramount," see cases
cited, n. 16, supra., to justify even indirect burdens on
First Amendment rights, nor those cases insisting that
the infringement of protected rights be no broader
than necessary to achieve the States' valid goal, see
cases cited, n. 17, supra. As we have indicated, the investigation of crime by the grand jury implements a
fundamental governmental role of securing the safety
of the person and property of the citizen/ 8 and it apA list of recent subpoeEas to the news media io; contained in the
appendix to the brief of amicus New York Times in No. 70-57.
38 Cf. State v. Knops, 49 Wis. 2d 647, 183 N. W. 2d 93 (1971),
in which a grand jmy was investigating the August 24, 1970, bombing of Sterling Hall on the University of Wisconsin l\1adi~on campus.
On August 26, 1970, an "underground" newspaper, the l\I::tdiHon
Kaleidoscope, printed a front-page story entitled "The Bombers Tell
Why and What Next-Exclusive to the Kaleidoscope." An editor
37
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pears to us that calling reporters to give testimony in (
the manner and for the reasons that other citizens are
called "bears a reasonable relationship to the achievement of the governmental purpose asserted as its justification." Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U. S. 516, 525
( 1960). If the test is that the Government "convincingly show a substantial relation between the information sought and a subject of overriding and compelling
state interest," Gibson v. Florida Investigation Committee, 371 U. S. 539, 546 (1963), it is quite apparent
(1) that the State has the necessary interest in extirpating the traffic in illegal drugs, in forestalling assassination attempts on the President, and in preventing
the community from being disrupted by violent disorders endangering both persons and property; and
(2) that, based on the: stories Branzburg and Caldwell
worte and Pappas' admitted conduct, the grand juries
called these reporters as they would other&-because it
was likely that they could supply information to help
the Government determine whether illegal conduct had
occurred and, if it had, whether there was sufficient evidence to return an indictment.
Similar considerations dispose of the reporters' claims
that preliminary to requiring their grand jury appearance, the State must show that a crime has been com-

I

.,..._,_.

-

--...-

of the Kaleidoscope was subpornaed, appeared, asserted his Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination, was given immunity,
and then pleaded that he had a First Amendment privilege against
disclosing his confidential informants. The Wisconsin Supreme Court
rejected his claim and upheld his contempt sentence: "[A]ppellant
faces five very narrow and specific questions, all of which arc founded
on information which he himself has already volunteered. The purpose of these questions is very clear. The need for answers to them
is 'overriding,' to say the least. The need for these answers is nothing
short of the public's need (and right) to protect itself from physical
attack by apprehending t lw perpetrators of such attack~." 49 WiH ..
2d, at 183 N. W. 2d, at - .

11

/,
~
~

'
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mitted and that they possess relevant information not
available from other sources. The role of the grand
jury as an important instrument of effective law enforcement necessa.rily includes an investigatory function with re~11jfil1etli"er 'a:~rime has
been conu nitted and who committed it. T o t his end
it "'i;1ust call ,;tt7lesses, in the manri'er best suited to
perform its task. A grand jury investigation of a crime
within its jurisdiction may be triggered by tips, rumors,
evidence proferred by the prosecutor, or the personal
knowledge of the grand jurors. Costello v. United
States, supra, at 362. It is only after the grand jury has (
examined the evidence that a determination of '.vhcther
the proceeding will result in an illdictment can be made:
"It is impossible to conceive that in such cases \\
the examination of wit.nesses must be stopped until
a basis is laid by an indictment formally preferred.
'"hen the very object of the examination is to af:ccr-·
tain who will be indicted." Hale v. Henkel, 201
U. S. 43, 65 (1906).
Sec also H endTicks v. United States, 223 U. S. 178 ( HH2) ;·
BlaiT v. United States, supm, at 282-283.
On the records before us, there is no reason whatsoever to believe that these gra~cl Junes a will probe
at will and without relation to existing need," DeGTegoTy
v. Attorney General of New Hampshire, 383 U. S. 825,
829 (1066), or to hold that these reporters, any more
than other citizens, should be excused from furnishing
mfori!!,.atwn they "Tiave that may help the grand
jury in arnving at its initial determinations. To hold
otherwise would but frustrate a.n. important public function in pursuit of wha.t appear to be elusive and speculative ends.
The privilege cla.imed here is conditional, not absolute; given the suggested preliminary showings and
compelling need, the reporter would be required to tes-

m7
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tify. Presumably, such a rule would reduce the instances in which reporters could be required to appear,
but predicting in advance "·hen and i11 what circumstances they could be compelled to do so would be
difficult. If newsmen's confidential sources aJ·c as sensitive as they are claimed to be, the pro,.pect of being
unmasked whenever a judge determines the situation
justifies it is hardly a satisfactory solution to the problem.~9 For them, it would appear that only an absolute
privilege would suffice.
We arc unwilling to embark the judiciary on a long
and difficult journey to such an uncertain destination.
The administration of a constitutional newsman's rivilegc wou present practical an conceptual difficulties
of a high order. Sooner or later, it would be uecessary
to del!nc those categories of newsmen who qualified
for the pnvliege, a questiOnable procedure in light of
the traditional doctrine that liberty of the press is the
right of the lonely pamphleteer who uses carbon pflper
or a mimeograph just as much as of the large metro~n "Undrr thr rn~r-by-r·ll~C mrthod of clr1·rlopinp; rulr~. it will be
difficult for potential informants and rrportrr~ to prrdirt \\'hethrr
tr~timon.1· will be rompellrd sincr the derision will tum on the judge's
ad hoc a~~C'~8mcnt in diffrrent fnrt setting~ of 'importanrr' or 'rrlevnnrc' in relation to thr frre prr~s intrrr~t. A 'generrd' drterrrnt
e!Tert is likely to m;;ult. Thi~ type of efTect stemH from the Yagueness of the tr:-t~ and from the unrNUtinty attrnding their npplication.
For ex:tmplr, if n reportrr·~ information goes to thr 'heart of thr matter' in 8itu:1tion X, :motlwr rrporter and informant who subsrquentl~r
arc in Situation Y ll'i!lnot know if 'henrt of thr matter rule X' will
he extended to thrm, and detrrrrnce will thereby re~ult. LC:'a1·ing
subst:tntial discretion with judp;rs to delineate those 'situntions' in
which rult's of 'rrleYnnce' or 'importance' apply would therefore
serm to undrrminr Rignifirnntly the d'frctivene~R of a rrporterinformer privilrgr." Noll', Rrporters and Their Sources: The ConRtitutional Right. to n Confidential RrlntionRhip, SO Ynle L. J. 317,
341 (1970). For ::m ex:1mplc of this ad hoc balancing, see In re
Grand Jury Witnesses, 322 F. Supp. 573 (ND Cal. 1970).
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politan publisher who utilizes the latest photocomposition methods. Freedom of the press is a "fundamental
personal right" which "is not confined to newspapers and
periodicals. It necessarily embraces pamphlets and
leaflets . . . . The press in its historic connotation comprehends every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of information and opinion." Lovell v. City of
Griffin, 303 U. S. 444, 450, 452 (1938). See also Mills
v. Alabama, 384 U. S. 214, 219 (1966); Murdock v.
Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105, 111 (1943). The informative function asserted by representatives of the organized
press in the present cases is also performed by lecturers,
political pollsters, novelists, academic researchers, and
dramatists. Almost any author may quite accurately
assert that he is contributing to the flow of information to the public, that he relies on confidential sources
of information, and that these sources wil be silenced
if he is forced to make disclosures before a grand jury. 40
In each instance where a reporter is subpoenaed to
testify, the courts would also be embroiled in preliminary factual and legal determinations with respect to
whether the proper predicate had been laid for the reporters' appearance: Is there probable cause to believe
Such a privilege might be claimed by groups that set up newspapers in order to engage in criminal activity and be insulated from
grand jury inquiry, regardles of Fifth Amendment grants of immunity. It might appear that such "sham" newspapers would be
easily distinguishable, yet the First Amendment ordinarily prohibits
courts from inquiring into the content of expression , except in cases
of obscenity or libel, and protect s speech and publications regnrdless of their motivation , orthodoxy, truthfulness, timeliness, or taste.
N ew York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 269-270 (1964) ;
Kingsley Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U. S. 684, 689 (1959);
Winters v. N ew York, 333 U. S. 507, 510 (1948); Thoma.s v. Collin.s,
323 U. S. 516, 537 (1945). By nffording a privilrge to some organs
of communication but not. to others, courts would inevitably b(}
di ~:; criminating on the basis of content.
40
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a crime has been committed? Is it likely that the
reporter has useful information gained in confidence?
Could the grand jury obtain the information elsewhere?'
Is the official interest sufficient to outweigh the claimed
privilege?
Thus, in the end, the courts would be inextricably
involved in distinguishing between the value of enforcing different criminal laws. By requiring testimony
from a reporter in investigations involving some crimes
but not in others, they would be making a value judgment which a legis,l ature had declined to make, since
in each case the criminal law involved would represent
a considered legislative judgment, not constitutionally
suspect, of what a conduct is liable to criminal prosecution. The task of judges, like other officials outside
the legislative branch, is not to make the law but to
uphold it in accordance with their oaths.
We decline, therefore, in the face of the evidence
now presented, to embark on a course which will entail
the drawing of ~ssamer distinctions unsuitable for constitutional adjud1cabon. Resolution and management
of this problem, if as serious as represented to us, are
branches of the Government. At
better left to t
era level and with infinitely superior ools comprehensively to survey the issue, Congress has much
more freedom to fashion standards and rules as narrow
or broad as deemed necessary to addres~s the evil discerned
and, equally important, to re-fashion those rules as
experience from time to time may dictate. There is
also merit in leaving state legislatures free, within :First
Amendment limits, to fashion their own standards in
light of the conditions and problems with respect to
prosecution and press in their own areas. It goes without saying, of course, that we arc po,verless to erect
any bar to state courts responding in their own way

1
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and construing their own constitutions so as to recogllize a newsman's privilege, either qualified or absolute.
In addition, there is much force in the pragmatic
view that the press has at its disposal powerful mechanisms of communication and is far from helpless to
protect itself from harassment or substantial harm.
The legislative solution is open to it, and in any
event, the press can be expected to hold its own with
local prosecutors, state or federa1. 41 Furthermore, if
what the newsmen urge in these cases is true-that law
enforcement cannot hope to gain and may suffer from
subpoenaing newsmen before grand juries-prosecutors
will be loath to risk so much for so little. Thus, at
the federal level the Attorney General has already
fashioned a set of rules for federal officials in connection with subpoenaing members of the press to testify
before grand juries or at criminal trials. ~ 2 These rules
~1

This powrr i~ rrco~nizrd in numrrou~ nphoriRms, e. fl.
Two newsmrn upsP.t a DA ,
With a srnndnlous rxpo~r,
Thr~· lost 011 the First
And wrre jnilrd unrrvrr~ed,
But the prr~s put tbr DA awn)·.

(Gur!;;t & Stanzlrr. Thr Con~titutionnl Ar~umrnt for New~mrn Conrrnling Their Sources, 64 Nw. U. L. Rrv. 18, 48 n. 148 (1969);
"Three hostile newspnprr~ nrr morr to he frnrrd thnn n thou~nnd
ba~•onet8" (:1ttributrcl to Napolron, Ad:nn~. Book of Quotntions 65Z
(1052)).
·~The "Guiclrlinrs for flubpoems to t hr N rws l\Iedin" wrre fir~t
nnnounrrd in a f'prrrh by thr Attorney Grnrrnl on Augu~t 10 , 1970,
nncl then "·rre rxprcssed in Drpnrtmrnt of .Tu~tire l\1emo No. 69Z
(8rptrmber 2, 1970), whic·h wns srnt to all Unitrd St:1trs nttornrys
by the As~istnnt Attomry General in chnr~r of thr Criminnl Division.
The Guidelines state th~1t "The Depnrtment of .Tu~tiee rrro~nizrs
that eompul~ory prore~s in sonw rirrum.·tnnre~ may hnvr n limiting
efTect on the exerci~e of First Amrndment ri~ht s . In detrrmining
whethrr to requr~t i~snam'c of a subpornn to 1he press, the a ppronch
in e\·ery rn~e mu~t be to weight thnt limit in~ rffrct ngninst the public
interest to be srrved in the fair administrntion of justice" and that

I
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are a major step in the direction petitioners desire to
move. They may prove wholly sufficient to resolve the
bulk of disagreements and controversies between press
and federal officials.
Finally, as we have earlier indicated, n,ews gathering
is not without its First Amendment xotect10ns, a.nd
gran JUry investigations if instituted or conducted other
than in good faith, would pose wholly different issues
for resolution under the First Amendment: ~ Official
harassment of the press undertaken not for purposes
of law enforcement but to disrupt a reporter's relationship with his news sources would have no justification.
Grand juries are subject to judicial control and subpoenas
to motions to quash. We do not expect courts will for-~
get that grand juries must operate within the limits of
the First Amendment as well as the Fifth.

I

III
We turn , therefore, to the disposition of the cases before us. From what we have said, It necessarily follows
that the decision in United States v. Caldwell, No. 70-57,
"Tho Department of Justice docs not consider the pre~s 'an investigative arm of the government.' Therefore, aU rmsonable attempts
should bo made to obtain information from non-press sources before
there is any con8iderntion of subpomaing tho pre~s ." The Guidelines
pro,·ide for ncgotial ions with the press and require the express authorization of the Attorney General for such subpoenas. Tho principles
to bo applied in authorizing Ruch ubpoonas arc slated to be whether
there is "sufficient rea son to believe that tho information sought
[from the journalist] is essential to a successful investigation," and
whether the Government has unsuccessfuly attempted to obtain the
information from ::d terna tiYe non-pres:; sourct's. The Guidelines provide, however, thnt in "emergencies and other unusual situations,"
subpoenas may be issued which do not exactly conform to the
Guidelines.
13
Cf. Younger v. Ilan·is, 401 U.S. 37, 49, 53-54 (1971).
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must be reversed. If there is no First Amendment privilege to reiuse to answer the relevant and matenal u"estions as {eel during a goo -fait 1 grand jury investiga_lion,
then it is a for1wri true that there is no pnvilege to
refuse to appear before such a grand JUry until the Government demonstrates some "compelling need" for a
newsman's testimony. Other issues were urged upon us,
but since they ·were not passed upon by the Court of
Appeals, we decline to address them in the first instance.

IV
Th~ decisions in No. 70--85. Branzburg v. Hayes and
Branzburg v. Meigs must be affirmed. Here, petitioner
refused to answer questions that directly related to
criminal conduct which he had observed and written
about. The Kentucky Court of Appeals noted that
marihuana is defined as a narcotic drug by statute, Ky.
Rev. Stat. § 218.010 (14), and that unlicensed possession or compounding of it was a felony punishable by
both fine and imprisonment. Ky. Rev. Stat. § 218.210. )
It held that petitioner "saw the commission of the statutory felonies of unlawful possession of marijuana and
d1e unlawful conversion of it into hashish," in Branzburg
v. ~' 461 S. W. 2d, at 346. Petitioner may be presumed to have observed similar violations of the state
narcotics laws during the research he did for the story
which forms the ba:sis of the subpoena in Branzburg v.
Meigs. In both cases, if what petitioner wrote was true,
he had direct information to provide the grand jury
concerning the commission of serious crimes.
The only question presented at the present time in
In the Maller of Paul Papp_as, No. 70--94, is whetJ;er
pe~itioner Pappas must appear before the grand .JUr,Y to
testifY pursnttnt to subpoena. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court characterized the record in this
case as "meager," and it is not clear what petitioner will

I
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be asked by the grand jury. It is not even clear that he
w~ed to divulge inforr;:mtion rece1vea m conlidence. We affirm the decision of the Massachusetts Supl::=~dicllg_Court ana hold that pehtwner must appear efore the grand jury to answer the questions put to
him, subject, of course, to the supervision of the presiding
judge as to "the propriety, purposes, and scope of the
grand jury inquiry and the pertinence of the probable
testimony." -Mass.-, 266 N. E. 2d, at 303- 304.

So ordered_

•

·,c·

lfp/ss 3cc 6/23/72

MR. JUSTICE POWELL, ccmcurrtng~ ftu_ ~

~ ~ ~.~~~~~~
I add tbta brief statement to emphasize what seems to

me to be the limited nature of the Court•s holdlng. The Court
does not hold that newsmen, subpoenaed to testify before a
grand jury, re without ccmstltutlonal rights wlth respect to the

ptherlng of newa or

~guarding their aourc•.

we do net hold, as suggested

Certainly,

tn the dissenting opinion, that

state and federal authorities are free to "annex" the news mecUa
as ''an Investigative arm of government. " The aollcltude

repeatedly shown by this Court for Firat Amendment freedoms
should be sufficient assurance against any such effort, even If

~

me seriously believed that the media -~ free and
untrammelled In the fullest sense of these terms - w•re

not able to protect themselves.
As Indicated In the cCilcludlng portion of the oplnlm,

the Court states that no harassment of newsmen wUl be

2.
tolerated. If a newsman beUeves that the grand Jury Investigation
1s not being ccmducted in good faith he i8 not without remedy.

Jadeed, If the newsman 1a called upcm to gtve tnformatioo bearing
only a remote and tenuous relationship to the subject of the
mvestlgatlon, or lt he baa some other reaaoo to believe that his

testimony implicates C<llfldenttal source relationships without
a legitimate need of law enforcement, he will have access to
the Court on a mc:jlon to quash and an appropriate protection

order may be tmtered. The asserted claim to prlv11ege should
be judged oo ita facta by the strtldng of a proper balance between

freedom ot the press and the obllgatton of aU citizens to give
relevant testimony with respect to criminal ccmduct. The ba.Juce
of these vital ccmstttutlonal and soeletal Interests oo a case-by-ease

buts accords wlth the tried and traditional way of adjudlcattng
aueh questlOD8.
In short, the Court merely holds that a newsman (hasuMer
%~

he a., te de:fiaed~ baa no testlmoolal priVilege as a matter of

3.
right under the Constitution. We do not hold that the protection
of. the eourts 11 unavailable to newsmen under circumstances

where legitimate First Amendment interests require protecttoo.

